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Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality
Addison C. Harris Lecture
October27, 1998
WILLIAM N. ESK1IDGE, JR.*
In the last generation, more than half the states have repealed their laws
criminalizing consensual sodomy, and many cities and some states have adopted
laws prohibiting private as well as public discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.' Nonetheless, there are today more antigay statutes, rules, and
regulations than ever before. The laws take three different forms. Some, such as the
exclusion of gay people from the armed forces, no-promotion-of-homosexuality
("no promo homo") policies, and presumptions against custody or adoption by gay
people, explicitly discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.2 Other laws, such
as bans against same-sex marriage and sodomy laws applying only to same-sex
behavior, discriminate on the basis of sex, not sexual orientation;3 but their
overwhelming effect is against gay people, and homophobia is what keeps these
laws on the books. Finally, some laws without sex or sexual orientation
classifications have discriminatory effects on gay people: general sodomy laws
which criminalize consensual intimacy and laws prohibiting race, sex, and other
forms of discrimination, but not sexual orientation discrimination.4 Such statutes
deprive gay people of privacy and nondiscrimination protections taken for granted
by other Americans.
* JohnA! GarvcrProfcssorofJurisprudence, Yale Law School. This Article is the published
version of my October 1998 Addison Harris Lecture at Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington. I am grateful for the questions and comments I received after the lecture and at
presentations of this Article at the law schools of Georgetown University, the University of
Minnesota, and George Mason University. I most appreciate questions raised by Margaret Brinig,
Mary Louise Fellows, David McGowan, and Suzanna Sherry.
1. See WLaiAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THEAPARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
apps. 2A, 2E (forthcoming 1999).
2. For cases discriminating against gay parents in custody disputes, see, for example, S. v. S.,
608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct App. 1980); GA. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct App. 1987); and Roe
v. Roe, 324 S.2d 691 (Va. 1985). For bans against adoption by gay people, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.042(3) (West 1997), and In re Appeal ofPima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d
830 (Ariz. CtApp. 1986). The armed forces exclusion is 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). These antigay
exclusions are analyzed in WILAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTEP, SnxuALrrY, GENDER,
AND THE LAw 388-407 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 17376 (Supp. 111996).
4. For cases excluding sexual orientation discrimination from Title VII, see, for example,
Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (gay man harassed by
coworkers); Uane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (transsexual); De Santis v.
Pacific Telephone & Telephone Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (discrimination and/or
harassment claims by effeminate man, lesbian couple, and other gay people); and Katharine M.
Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (exhaustive
survey of cases). See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(F)(i) (West 1999) (excluding transvestites and
transsexuals from previous protection under Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (1994)
(excluding trnssexalism, transvestism, and homosexuality from "disabilities" covered under the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
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All of these laws might be said to violate the core principle of the Equal
Protection Clause, that similarly situated people must be treated similarly by the
state. Although gay people have long accepted this kind of claim, their attorneys
have rarely pressed it in court, and equal protection attacks on antigay policies have
almost never been successful. The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick,5 upholding the constitutionality of laws criminalizing consensual
"homosexual sodomy," as the Court put it, created a popular syllogism for denying
homo equality: because the state can make "homosexual conduct" a felony, surely
it can also stigmatize "homosexuals" as presumptive felons. The greater power
(criminalization) surely includes the lesser (civil disabilities). This syllogism has
shown cracks in the 1990s, however. For the first time in American history, federal
as well as some state courts have applied equal protection guarantees for the benefit
of gay people. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in Romer v. Evans6 that a state
initiative revoking local sexual orientation discrimination ordinances violated the
Equal Protection Clause if disconnected from public-regarding policies and
adopted, instead, because of antigay animus. Evans could be read, broadly, to
support other challenges to federal and state policies discriminating against gay
people because of their minority orientation. As for sex-based classifications
harming them, gay people can argue that the Supreme Court's precedents support
the Hawaii Supreme Court's determination in Baehr v. Lewin' that exclusion of
same-sex couples from civil marriage is constitutionally problematic sex
discrimination.
These are all logical readings of the Equal Protection Clause and the Supreme
Court's precedents. But they are hardly inevitable. Evans contains broad language
supporting claims for homo equality, but it arose in a unique factual setting that
could render it sui generis. Baehr is more clearly reasoned but represents only the
construction of a state constitution and may not be followed by other courts,
including the United States Supreme Court. The first Part of this Article will
explore the doctrinal implications of Evans for other antigay policies and will
suggest those that would appear most vulnerable under that precedent, including the
Hardwick suggestion that "homosexual" sodomy might be criminalized even if
"heterosexual" sodomy is not. The second Part of the Article will address the sex
discrimination argument for homo equality, particularly in the context of same-sex
marriage. For both kinds of arguments, there is a fair amount of doctrinal play.
Moreover, many scholars and judges believe that courts dare not press the
implications of homo equality, out of fear of an antigay backlash that could
undermine courts' legitimacy. The last Part of this Article suggests a normative
political theory tat supports a principled and progressive role for the judiciary
even under pragmatic assumptions.
Larger doctrinal, political, and cultural themes will flow from the analysis I have
outlined. Antigay state policies are the current testing ground for equal protection
jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court faces a dilemma. The analytical
5.478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7.852 P.2d44 (Oaw. 1993), on remand sub noma. Baehr v. Mlike, CIV. No. 91-1394,1996
WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct Dec. 3, 1996) (on appeal as of May 1, 1999).
1086 [Vol. 74:1085
MULTIVOCAL PREJUDICES
structure established in the race and sex discrimination cases would be
compromised if the Supreme Court turns its back on claims for homo equality, but
many judges and most Americans do not consider sexual orientation discrimination
analogous to sex or race discrimination and would be horrified if the Court accepted
the claims of homo equality. Ironically, identity politics is intense on both sides of
this divide: Gay people consider antigay attitudes prejudice that fundamentally
compromises their equal participation in society and politics, but the people who
hold those attitudes consider them constitutive of their own identities as well as
important public values. Judges are not without resources to manage this dilemma,
and the last Part of this Article urges a middle course between pragmatist pandering
to existing attitudes and kamikaze judicial activism. The middle way consists of
cautious judicial insistence that the rule of law fully applies to gay people, that
antigay policies be procedurally deliberate and narrowly tailored, and that pockets
of toleration be protected.
I. ANTIGAY PoLicurs AD THE EVOLUTION OF EQUAL
PROTECTION LAW
The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws is too broad to be
applied literally, as all laws discriminate and government could not operate if all its
discriminations were continually in question. Any realistic theory of equal
protection must find a principle that identifies those situations where serious
scrutiny is justified. The framers of the clause and the early Supreme Court
decisions focused equal protection attention on laws that subjected a class of
citizens to special disabilities unjustified by natural differences.8 The original
expectations and early cases reflected a class-based approach. Especially when the
Justices believed the class burdened by a state rule was a racial minority, mainly
African American, they subjected it to serious scrutiny. But the Court cautioned in
Plessy v. Ferguson,9 the decision adopting the separate-but-equal formula in race
cases, that the state was not responsible for private attitudes or actions that were
class-based. The Plessy policy proved unstable in the face of evidence that
separate-but-equal was simply a way that African Americans were subordinated as
a class. By World War II, the Plessy policy was a positive embarrassment, as the
New Deal Justices saw apartheid as a matter of racism, alarmingly akin to Nazi
racism, for which the state bore direct responsibility."0
It was in this context that the New Deal Court, in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.," refined equal protection doctrine to justify serious scrutiny when
8. See WILLIAME. NELsON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988); Melissa L. Saunders,
Equal Protecion, ClassLegislation and Color-Blindness, 96 MicH. L. REv. 245 (1997); Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. RFV. 341 (1949).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALEL.J. 741,753-65 (1981).
11.304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938); see Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest,
52 YALELJ. 1,20-21 (1942) (articulating a"representation-reinforcing" theory ofjudicial review
based on footnote 4); see also JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT 75-77 (1980)
(discussing Carolene Products footnote 4).
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class-based legislation was apparently the consequence of prejudice against a
discrete and insular minority, such as African Americans and Jews. This theory
was a legal process version of traditional equal protection thinking. Judicial
activism was justified only in those circumstances where the political process had
in an important sense failed, and the Court considered a process infected with
prejudice a corrupt process, consistent with American thinking that strongly
distanced our democracy from Nazi totalitarianism. This legal process refinement
was important background for the Warren Court's landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,2 which invalidated school segregation policies because of
their class-based consequences. Brown substantially overruled Plessy because the
Justices insisted that the state take some responsibility for private prejudice and
affirmative steps to reconstruct itself in a nondiscriminatory way.
Brown was the apotheosis of class-based equal protection theory, adapted for the
modem regulatory state. Yet its great success and its great failure planted the seeds
of a new focus for the next generation of equal protection cases. Brown's great
success was that it swept away hundreds of laws where the state expressly
sponsored apartheid, culminating in Loving v. Virginia,3 which rendered
unconstitutional laws criminalizing different-race marriages, and ultimately
committed the judiciary to supervise transitions from segregated to unitary
educational and other public systems. Yet this success carried with it the seeds of
failure, or at least retreat The post-Loving cases posed harder issues for the Court,
because they typically involved policies that hurt African Americans or other racial
and ethnic minorities but did not clearly target them for legal exclusion, and
because they were decided in a political context reluctant to expend state resources
to redress historic racial inequities. The Court grappled with the distinction
between de jure discrimination, which was illegal under Loving, and de facto
discrimination, which the Court between 1973 and 1976 ruled was not illegal
unless actually motivated by animus against racial minorities.' 4 The de jure/de facto
distinction resurrected the Court's pre-New Deal disinclination to hold the state
responsible for private prejudice and shifted the focus of equal protection law from
a class-based inquiry to a classification-driven one.
Loving itself reflected this important doctrinal shift. Chief Justice Warren's
analysis of the miscegenation law ignored its effect on discrete and insular
minorities (blacks, most of whom did not want to marry whites) and focused instead
on the irrational classification (race) and the illegitimate purpose (racial purity,
or white supremacy). Analytically, Loving replaced Brown as the key race case after
1967, as the Court ruled that policies not invoking race as a classification were not
unconstitutional unless plaintiffs could show a racist purpose" and, most
provocatively, that policies invoking race as a classification but benefitting discrete
12.347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13.388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. See Washington v. Davis,426 U.S. 229,239-40 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413
U.S. 189,208 (1973).
15. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
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and insular minorities are nonetheless constitutionally suspect. 6 The recent
affirmative action cases have turned Brown and the New Deal vision on their heads.
Loving also made clear that the Court had essentially adopted an equal protection
"double standard": most discriminating laws just have to reveal a "rational basis,"
a test hard to fail; only those laws using disapproved classifications, such as race
and ethnicity, are subjected to "strict scrutiny," and usually invalidated. 7
Other social movements of the 1960s followed Brown in litigating to overturn
policies hurting traditionally subordinated classes, and Loving in asserting that
certain classifications are inherently suspect and certain state policies illegitimate.
The most significant cases were the sex-and-gender cases."8 In Craig v. Boren, the
Supreme Court concluded that sex-based classifications are quasi-suspect, mainly
because they tend to reflect "archaic and overbroad"'9 stereotypes about women and
men.20 Perhaps because the plaintiffs in Craig were men challenging a rule favoring
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old women, class-based reasoning was largely absent,
and the heightened scrutiny rested mainly on classification-based reasoning. In
Craig, the Carolene formulation of class was irrelevant anyway, because women
are neither insular nor a minority in the population. Finally, the Court emphasized
the relationship between suspect classification and illegitimate state goal: Just as
the Court would not tolerate race-based classifications that were motivated by a
policy of white supremacy or race stereotypes (Loving), so the Court would not
tolerate sex-based classifications that were motivated by a policy of gender
stereotypes or male supremacy (Craig).2 The sex discrimination cases were argued
under the Court's double standard but immediately loosened it up. Some sex
discriminations were invalidated under the rational basis test,22 while others were
16. The Court has been skeptical of such policies since Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,290 (1978), and has deepened that skepticism in City ofRichmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), andAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
17. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Cour4 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search ofEvolving
Doctrine on a ChangingCourt A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 37
(1972).
18. These are comprehensively excerpted and analyzed in BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL.,
SExDIscRMINAiONAND TE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY ch. 1 (1996).
19.429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
20. This theme had been sounded in earlier cases. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (plurality opinion) (holding a male spouse of an Air Force officer a dependent by the same
standards as a female spouse); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding a divorcee mother
liable for child support); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding differences in
social security survivor's benefits based on gender unconstitutional). The theme provided a basis
for upholding discriminations in, for example, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(upholding differences between male and female Naval officers' mandatory retirement provisions).
21. But compare Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 507, and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355
(1974), both of which upheld sex discriminations, in part because they were adopted for the
permissible purpose of remedying disadvantages suffered by women.
22. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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struck down under heightened-but-not-strict scrutiny,23 and yet others were upheld
under standards the Court left unclear.
24
The sexual orientation discrimination cases have followed the pattern of the sex
discrimination cases: The legal defense arms of a liberation movement have insisted
upon legal equality through equal protection litigation to overturn discriminations
against its members; to that effect, gay-friendly lawyers have argued that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification, like race, or a quasi-suspect one, like sex,
and that morality-based defenses of antigay laws amount to the same kind of
inadmissible prejudice as racism and sexism.25 It remains to be seen how the
Supreme Court will assimilate these arguments into the Court's evolving equal
protection jurisprudence, but the Court's first serious effort, Romer v. Evans, is
analytically fascinating in its synthesis of that jurisprudence.26 Justice Kennedy's
opinion opened with the Plessy dissent's objection to class legislation, where one
group is excluded from ordinary legal protection. Like Brown and unlike Loving,
therefore, Evans emphasized the class-based effects of the Colorado initiative.
Keeping the Court's options open, Evans said nothing about whether sexual
orientation is a suspect classification, like race or sex, but still struck down the law
under the rational basis test, as there was no legitimate state goal for the initiative.
Like Loving and unlike Brown, therefore, Evans emphasized the initiative's
impermissible purpose, to express animus against gay people.
The Court's assertion that animus rather than morality was the state goal, its
belief that the initiative was class-based in the old-fashioned sense, and its
sidestepping the level of scrutiny issue but giving the rational basis test sharper
teeth, are features of the opinion that justify deeper exploration. Evans commits the
Court to no particular posture in future sexual orientation cases and might be
viewed as the Court's generous offer to judges and commentators to provide the
Justices with further information about antigay laws and their consequences for gay
23. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977)
(social security survivor's benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979) (alimony payments by
wife for husband).
24. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape law); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Selective Service Act).
25. Almost all ofthe early gay equality cases were brought under the Due Process Clause. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditionsfor
Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817
(1997). However, cases in the last decade have emphasized equal protection arguments. See
E KRImGE & HUNTER, supra note 2, at 92-124,301-04,374-404,638-39,807-13,913-37.
26. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Commentary on this decision has already proliferated. Those that
have most influenced my thinking are Akhil Reed AmarAttainder andAmendment 2: Romer's
Rightness, 95 Mica. L. REv. 203 (1997); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle,
13 CoNsT. COMiMENTARY 257 (1996); Toni Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L.
Rnv. 45 (1996); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans andDemocracy'sDomain, 50 VAND. L. REV.
361 (1997); and Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of
Warren CourtActivism, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 67. The best pre-Evans debate is between Kenneth
L. Karst, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VIsIoNs OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE,
GENDER,ANDRELIGION 182-86 (1993), and Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual
Rights and Citizen Initiatives: Is Constitutionalism Unconstitutional?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETiCS & PUB. POL'Y 93-135 (1995).
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lives, nongay lives, and the idea of equal protection of the laws. In response,
academics can offer the Court useful, and complexifying, information about current
thinking regarding prejudice, history, and politics, as they relate to gaylegal
equality. The remainder of this Article does precisely that, exploring the logical,
cultural, and political ramifications of Evans for equal protection challenges to
antigay policies.
A. Hardwick and Discriminatory Sodomy Laws
Evans leaves Hardwick in equal protection purgatory. The earlier decision is
distinguishable on its facts, as the Georgia sodomy law had a long Anglo-American
pedigree and created a class defined by conduct rather status. The opinion for the
Court in Hardwick, however, emphasized that it was only evaluating the
constitutionality of laws against "homosexual sodomy,"27 suggesting that
"heterosexual sodomy" might be given constitutional protectioh. This distinction
is problematic under Evans. In the long history of sodomy laws, Hardwick's
distinction is something of a novelty: It did not show up in state law until 1969;28
it targets gay people for gratuitous, special stigma; and it imposes on gay people a
particularly severe disability, potential criminal liability for consensual conduct.
Nor are the possible state goals for the Hardwick distinction passable under Evans
scrutiny. The most apparent reasons for making oral sex between two women, but
not between a woman and a man, criminal would be insistence upon rigid gender
roles or social prejudice against gay people.29 The first reason is inadmissible under
Craig, and the second reason would appear to be problematic under Evans. A third
reason, that same-sex sodomy is more likely to spread venereal disease than
different-sex sodomy, is rarely advanced by states themselves, because it is
unsupported by empirical evidence and has been pervasively rejected by medical
health professionals, who maintain that sodomy laws impede the medical campaign
against AIDS.3"
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,188 & n2 (1986).
28. The first state to make only same-sex, and not different-sex, consensual sodomy a crime
was Kansas. See 1969 KAN. Sass. LAws § 21-3505. For a history of sodomy laws, which
traditionally did not apply to woman-woman intercourse but did apply to man-woman and man-
man intercourse, see Wtlliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming).
29. Revulsion against oral or anal sex per se would not support the Hardwick distinction. If it
is okay for Bill and Monica to enjoy oral sex but not for Monica and Linda, the reason cannot be
revulsion at oral sex per se. Instead, it must be either a reaction to Monica's violating her gender
role in the latter case, or the suggestion that the act reflects an illegitimate desire of Monica for a
woman rather than a man.
30. The venereal disease argument is made in, for example, LAWRENCE BURTOFT, SETTINGTH
REcoRD STRAIGHT: WHAT RESEARCH REALLY SAYS ABoUT THE SoCIAL CONSEQUENCES oF
HoMosExuALITY 32-35 (1995), and in amicus briefs filed by antigay traditionalists in some
sodomy cases, including Hardwick. Public health professionals in sodomy-challenge cases have
disavowed such arguments, for reasons discussed approvingly in Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
123-24 (Mont 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250,263-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996);
and TOMAS J. PHLIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: TH
AIDS EPIDEMcC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993).
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Evans, therefore, potentially supports an equal protection challenge to state laws
criminalizing only same-sex sodomy and should be read as a retreat from, or
retraction of, Hardwick's focus on homosexual sodomy alone. But once Hardwick's
focus on homosexual sodomy is jettisoned, then the Court's purported rational
basis-antihomosexual sentiment-also falls away,3 and the Georgia statute might
be stranded in the same way the Colorado initiative was, without a legitimate state
goal supporting it This might be so, but the Court has yet to rule on the matter, and
Evans deliberately refrained from discussing its implications for Hardwick." The
Court's silence creates a genuine legal puzzle: In a world of both Hardwick and
Evans, antigay measures will, potentially, be either defensible as expressions of
public antihomosexual morality or vulnerable as expressions of antihomosexual
animus.33 Hence, a court has discretion as to decision of constitutional questions,
depending upon how the judges choose to categorize the claims and defenses in a
particular case.
3 4
Justice Kennedy's use of the term "animus" in Evans borrows from the race cases
and suggests a linkage made by philosopher Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, that
homophobia in our society often resembles racial prejudice in its hysterical
qualities: Like the archetypical racist, many homophobes view objects of their
hatred as dirty people whose fantasized disgusting conduct justifies the
homophobe's imagined or acted-out violence against them. 5 (This feature of
homophobia was recently acted out in the torture and murder of Matthew Shephard
in Wyoming.) Young-Bruehl adds that homophobia has also traditionally resembled
antisenitism in its obsessional qualities. Like Jews, homosexuals are viewed as an
advantaged conspiratorial group preying on the homophobe and his kin.36
Significantly, she adds, homophobia also resembles sexism in its narcissistic
qualities. Like people of the opposite sex, homosexuals are viewed as "The Other,"
31. The Supreme Court ruled that Georgia's criminalization of homosexual sodomy was
rationally related to its popular disapproval of homosexuality. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. But
ifthe Georgia law were applied as it is written, to make different-sex as well as same-sex sodomy
a felony, it might not be able to rest upon that basis. As the large majority of heterosexuals commit
oral sex, the crime for which Hardwickwas arrested, the Georgia law might no longer be supported
by popular sentiment.
32. The Court's silence about Hardwick is striking in light of the dissent's insistence that
Hardwick foreclosed the Court's result. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-43 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
33. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BIL OF
RIGHTS J. 89, 89-90, 138-46 (1997). For a response, see Richard Duncan, The Narrow and
Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial)
Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 147 (1997).
34. See Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993).
35. ELIsABsTfYOUNG-BRUEHL, THEANAToMY OF PREJUDICES (1996); see also Gregory M.
Herek, Psychological Heterosexism andAnti-Gay Violence: The Social Psychology ofBigotiy
andBashing, in HATE CRIMEs: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 149
(Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992).
36. See YouNG-BREHL, supra note 35, at 32-34.
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a group whose differentness helps the homophobe define his own sexual identity. 7
Young-Bruehl's view of the multiple roots of homophobia helps us see what Justice
Kennedy might have found disturbing in the Colorado case. The campaign yielding
the Evans initiative, conducted by Colorado for Family Values, made arguments
closely tracking the hysterial and obsessional arguments previously deployed
against Jews and African Americans. Gay people were defined as AIDS-diseased
because of their "voracious," "high-risk" (anal sex), and promiscuous sexual lives,
and as a wealthy group seeking "special rights" so they could be free to "attack" the
family and the church and to "indoctrinate" and recruit the state's young people.1
8
The overall thrust of their campaign was highly narcissistic, as it emphasized
traditional gender roles that were threatened by gay people.
If Young-Bruehl is right that homophobia is a multivocal, all purpose prejudice,
the tension between Evans and Hardwick is deepened. The same multivocal
features of homophobia render it particularly virulent from the perspective of the
gay person (Evans), but variously attractive and functional from the perspective of
the antigay person (Hardwick). This illustrates how identity politics figures into
both sides of the issue. Openly gay people's collective identity, and their collective
problems, derive from the power of widespread antigay feelings. Contrariwise,
homophobia serves identity as well as emotional needs of other people, including
many closeted gay people. 9 That some religions emphasize antigay doctrines means
that homophobia also implicates some people's religious identity as well. Because
intensely felt political identities are arrayed on both sides of gay rights issues, the
Court might be loathe to choose between a full gay equality that would antagonize
homophobes and no gay rights that would antagonize gay people and their families.
One middle ground between these poles would be that staked out by the Hardwick
dissents: toleration of gay people's intimate relations by the state, with private
individuals free to shun and dislike the conduct and the people so tolerated. This
position, of course, would require the overruling of Hardwick, which is a precedent
so riven with problems of accuracy, fairness, and fidelity to precedent that its
overruling would serve larger rule of law functions in any event.4" This middle
ground has the advantage of allowing narcissistic homophobes to differentiate
37. See id.; see also ADRIENNE RICH, Compulsory Heterosexuality andLesbian Existence,
in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE, 1979-1985 (1986) (stating that compulsory
heterosexuality is the way men enforce subordinate status on all women, not just lesbians).
38. The, documents used by Colorado for Family Values are reprinted in Robert F. Nagel,
Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTs J. 167, 191-99 (1997), and in ESKDGE &
HuNTER, supra note 2. See also STEPHEN BRANFORD, GAY POLrIcs VS. COLORADO AND
AMERICA: THlNSIDE STORY oFAMENDMENT 2 (1994).
39. Consistent with the hysterical qualities of homophobia, many of the most antigay people
harbor strong feelings of attraction to people of their same sex.
40. For just a few of the cogent critiques of Hardwik, see generally CHARLEs FRIED, ORDER.
AND LAw 81-84 (1991); RicHARD A- PosNER, SEX AND REASON 341-50 (1992); LAuRENCE H.
TRIE, AMERIcANCoNSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1421-35 (2d ed. 1988); Eskridge, supra note 28; Anne
B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden
Determinants ofBowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Sylvia A- Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.. 1493 (1988); and Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1989).
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themselves from sexual "Others" without unduly intruding on the privacy of the
latter, but would not satisfy obsessional homophobes, who desire to have their
enemies out in the open. That the fears of obsessional homophobes seem to have
no rational grounding, and for that reason have lost much of their appeal in the last
generation, might require that they not trump the human rights of gay people,
however.
B. Custody andAdoption
Although not the first time the Court had given rational basis review greater
bite,4" Evans was remarkable in the strictness of the Court's examination.
Colorado's Amendment 2 prohibited or preempted any law or policy "whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination."42 The State defended the sexual orientation discrimination
created by the initiative as rationally related to state policies conserving scarce
resources for enforcing civil rights laws, protecting the rights of parents, landlords,
and employers not to associate with gay people, and sending a message that
homosexuality does not have a state stamp of approval.43 All of these policies were
apparently more rational than the antihomosexual sentiment held to be a rational
basis in Hardwick, but the Evans Court ruled the Colorado initiative invalid, in
large part because "its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class that it affects." '44 The Court characterized the initiative as a status-based law
aimed at a class of citizens and held that such laws violate the core equal protection
command that "'a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest."' 45
The socio-legal process described above has an historical dimension. In its
analysis of the unprecedented and broad class-based disability of the Colorado
initiative, the Evans Court ruled that, by revoking the antidiscrimination protection
some local ordinances afforded gay people, the initiative deprived them of
"protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in
41. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholding a law disadvantaging the mentally
disabled but insisting on objective reason); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Cfr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down a zoning ordinance which disadvantaged the mentally disabled
because there was no reason for the law but negative attitudes toward, and fear of the mentally
retarded). But cf Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (accepting assumed health
concerns as a basis for rent-seeking regulation); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (allowing a state leeway to regulate piecemeal to achieve speculative goal).
42. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,624 (1996) (quoting CoLO. CoNsT. art. I, § 30b).
43. See Petitioners' Brief at 13, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
44. Evans, 517 U.S. at 631.
45. Id. at 634 (quoting United States Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(emphasis omitted)).
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a free society.""' By delivering Evans on (almost) the one-hundredth anniversary
of Plessy and opening the opinion with the class legislation language from the
Plessy dissent, the Court rhetorically recognized that the state neutrality required
by the equal protection clause is historically situated. Justice Harlan's Plessy
dissent was neither color-blind nor antiracist 47 Harlan's argument was, instead, that
it was socially and politically unproductive for the law to instantiate a class-based
system where African Americans were formally pushed to the bottom.
In earlier articles, I have set forth the historical outlines of a similar account of
a class-based system where gay Americans were formally pushed to the bottom,
albeit a bottom defined by the closet rather than the ghetto." The state
"Kulturkampf' against homosexuals in the 1940s and 1950s was animated by the
same kind of hysterical, obsessional, and narcissstic private prejudices that have
animated antisemitism, racism, and sexism, respectively. State repression
contributed multifariously to an apartheid of the closet, less brutal than racial
apartheid was, but equally unproductive. Evans can be read as the Court's
recognition that the state contribution to the apartheid of the closet carries with it
today a modest state responsibility not to reinforce the closet, as the Colorado
initiative sought to do and for reasons that explicitly resonated with traditional
tropes of prejudice. Consequently, any state rule that treats gay people as a class
deserving less state protection than straight people requires justification going
beyond antigay animus.
Consider this historical reading of Evans as applied to rules against adoption by
gay people and presumptions against child custody by lesbian, gay, or bisexual
parents. These rules are, on their face, neither as unprecedented nor so broadly
sweeping as Colorado's initiative was; hence, Evans might be distinguished. On the
other hand, the antigay adoption and custody rules have become increasingly
isolated; only three states (Arizona, Florida, and Utah) forbid gay people from
adopting, and a larger but shrinking number of states presume, in varying degrees
of clarity, against child custody for gay parents.49 Moreover, states with such
antigay policies often fail to apply the same policies against heterosexual
fornicators, adulterers, and sodomites.5" A recent Florida decision took a child away
from its lesbian mother and placed the child with the father, a convicted murderer
just released from prison. The court based its decision on the sexual "conduct,"
46.Id. at 631.
47. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IowA L.
Rnv. 151 (1996).
48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Close4
1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 703 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Privacy Jurisprudence];
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-
Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1007 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, American
Regulation].
49. See supra text accompanying note 2.
50. Compare Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct App. 1978) (holding that
adultery does not disqualify a parent from custody that is otherwise in the best interest of the child),
with Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct App. 1987) (holding that the same applies to
homosexuality, except that the gay father could not visit the children accompanied by another
man).
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with consenting adults, of the mother and de-emphasized the conduct of the father,
murder of an unconsenting adult."' Florida's open discrimination against adoption
or custody by gay parents, in particular, is more historically connected with class
legislation than the Colorado initiative was, because Florida was one of the two
epicenters of antigay "Kulturkampf' in the 1950s, and Florida's antigay policies
create a class of people denied protections even more basic than those denied by the
Colorado initiative. Most important, the fit between antigay custody policy and its
rationales is so wobbly as to suggest antigay animus as their goal-a goal which
would make Evans squarely applicable.
Traditionally, judges reasoned from the existence of sodomy laws that
"sodomites"-which gay people presumptively are in hysterical discourse-are per
se so immoral that they should be disfavored when the State is involved in child
placement.5 " This hysterical kind of argument has lost most of its force in
jurisdictions without sodomy laws and would lose more if Hardwick were
overruled. Additionally, as the.large majority of heterosexuals engage in sodomy,
there is scant reason to invoke sodomy laws to discriminate against gay
people-unless the state sodomy law discriminates, which is itself inconsistent with
the core holding of Evans, for the reasons explored above. Finally, the state policy
goal in the areas of adoption and custody for some time has been the "best interests
of the child." Any effort by the state to use children to make a symbolic statement
of animus against gay people is more vicious than the Evans initiative, unless a
parent's sodomy can somehow be tied to the child's best interests by a non-
obsessional chain of factual reasoning. If it cannot, the antigay policy is not only
way underinclusive (it allows most sodomites (the straight ones) to have custody),
but it is way overinclusive as well (it excludes (gay) parents who will be the "best"
for many children)-precisely the problem that Evans found unconstitutionally
irrational in the Colorado initiative. 3
The foregoing reasons have pressed even traditionalist states away from per se
rules against gay parental custody, but some states still have discriminatory
presumptions. The modem justification for these presumptions is that gay people
are not good parents, or are not as good at parenting as straight people.54 Several
features of these presumptions suggest that they are driven by prejudice based on
antigay feelings, and not the best interests of the child. That they are lineal
descendants of the discredited per se rules suggests that the presumptions are
modem pretexts for older prejudice-based arguments against gay parenting. The
51. See Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 WL 491692, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 30,
1996). The mother died soon thereafter, and the court's order was vacated, presumably so that it
would not stand as precedent in Florida.
52. See, e.g., Immerman v. Immerman, 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 127 (Cal. Ct App. 1959);
Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842, 843 (Ga. 1973); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379,
381-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102,108-09 (Va. 1995).
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,633 (1996).
54. Compare Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 833 (surveying the heterogeneous case law and proposing an omnibus
presumption against gay custody, visitation, and adoption), with Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell
Pea, Warring with Wardle: Moralit, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL.
L. Rav. 253 (responding point-by-point to Wardle).
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pretextual nature of these presumptions is demonstrated by the substantial gap
between their antigay policy and the best interests of the child. This suggests that
hysteria about dirty homosexual behavior and obsession with fantasized gay
predation still underlies the policies.
Dozens of empirical studies have compared the development of children raised
by gay parents or households with those reared by straight parents or households.5"
No study that I have seen unequivocally endorses broad presumptions against gay
custody or adoption, and the large majority of the studies specifically support a gay-
neutral rule most consistent with Evans. Although most of the studies state at the
outset that they offer only provisional conclusions given their small and necessarily
nonrandom samples,56 a recent meta-analysis correcting for small sample size (but
not for nonrandomness) found that the data "indicate no difference between
homosexual and heterosexual parents," and support rules that do not take sexual
orientation into account when making custody and visitation decisions." On
developmental criteria such as self-esteem, adjustment to new circumstances and
emotional disorder, the children raised in same-sex parental households are
virtually indistinguishable from children raised in different-sex parental households.
The few studies that have compared two-mother households with single-mother
households have found that children raised in the former are better adjusted than
children raised inthe latter, whether the single parent is straight or lesbian." These
studies support the Evans-like finding that antigay childrearing presumptions have
the weakest connection with the best interests of the child.
55. Leading studies include Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: PsychosocialAssumptions in
Fami yLaw, 44 AM PYCHoLoaisT941 (1989); Susan Golombok etal., Children in Lesbian and
Single Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PsYCHOL. &
PsycmATRY 551 (1983); Mary E. Hotvedt & Jane B. Mandel, Children ofLesbian Mothers, in
HoMosExuALrrY: SocIAL, PSYcHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL IssuEs 275,282 (William Paul et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter HoMosxuALrry IssuEs]; and David J. Kleber et al., The Impact of
Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Cases: A Review of the Literature, 14 BuLL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCIATRY & L. 81 (1986). Competing reviews of the empirical literature are contained
in Wardle, supra note 54, and Ball & Pea, supra note 54.
56. See, e.g, Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation
of Their Children? Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32
DsvELoPMENTALPsYCHOL. 3,8 (1996) (indicating the impossibility of recruiting a random sample
of gay parents because of the closetry of most); Charlotte . Patterson, Children ofLesbian and
GayParents, 63 CimxnDEv. 1025,1036-39 (1992) (surveying the studies, including those of the
author). Compare Philip A. Belcastro et al.,A Review of Data Based Studies Addressing the
Affects ofHomosexual Parenting on Children's Sexual and Social Functioning, 20 J. DIVORCE
& REMARRIAGE 105 (1993) (harsher survey of the studies), with Mike Allen & Nancy Burrell,
Comparing the Impact of Homosexual and Heterosexual Parents on Children: Meta-Analysis
of ExistingResearch, 32 .HOMOSEXUALITY 19 (1996) (correcting for some of the methodological
limits of previous studies).
57. Allen & Burrell, supra note 56, at 28-30.
58. See Richard Green et al, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with Solo
Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVE OF SEXUAL BEHAviOR, 167
(1986); Golombok et al., supra note 55, at 562-67; Rhonda R. Rivera, LegalIssues in Gay and
Lesbian Parenting, in GAYAND SBiAN PARNt, 199, 226 n.79 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987)
(reporting an unpublished study comparing children in households having two lesbian parents,
with those in households having a single female parent, whether straight or lesbian).
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The few legal scholars who defend antigay presumptions do so on grounds that
can be directly linked to traditional, and rhetorically abandoned, antihomosexual
prejudice of the sort that Evans faulted. Professor Lynn Wardle, the leading
proponent of antigay family law presumptions, argues that children will be harmed
if they are raised by same-sex parents because (1) such parents engage in dirty
extramarital conduct, (2) the children of such households tend to depart from and
to be confused about traditional gender roles, and (3) the children will tend to
become homosexual themselves and may even be molested by their gay parents.59
Professor Carlos Ball and Janice Pea argue in impressive detail that there are no
factual bases for Wardle's claims that these children are confused, grow up to be
gay, or are molested.6 Wardle's last assertion is the boldest, as the social science
evidence shows that child molestation is overwhelmingly a male activity, with
straight men just as or more (depending on the study) prone to it as gay men, and
lesbian as well as straight women the least prone.6' Added to his surprisingly weak
factual claims is the striking way Wardle's argumentation rhetorically tracks
prejudice-based antihomosexual rhetoric in this century, namely, (1) the hysterical
focus on dirty sexual activities such as sodomy, (2) the narcissistic insistence on
rigid gender identities, and (3) the obsessional focus on the predatory homosexual
seeking to recruit new homosexuals. As in Evans itself, the weak connection
between antigay rules and their ostensible policy goals and the strong connection
between antigay rules and traditional prejudice are mutually and powerfully
reinforcing.
Compared to antigay child custody rules, Evans poses fewer problems for "don't
ask, don't tell" policies by state institutions such as the armed forces. Take the
military exclusion of people for self-identifying as bisexual, lesbian, or gay. One
rationale for the policy, namely, that the statement is evidence of sodomy which is
illegal under military law, is vulnerable if Hardwick bites the constitutional dust.
More important, military law prohibits all kinds of sodomy, which is an activity
common among straights as well as gays. A woman who says she is a lesbian is only
slightly more likely to have engaged in oral sex than a woman who says she is
straight, and substantially less likely to have engaged in anal sex (the traditional
understanding of sodomy).62 Because the gay woman is disciplined under
circumstances where a similarly situated straight woman is not, she is denied equal
protection of the laws, unless the state can show a non-animus basis for such
policies. But the standard arguments for such policies-the lesbian is a disgusting
sodomite, violates gender norms, and threatens vulnerable heterosexuals-closely
track the hysterical, narcissistic, and obsessional features of classic American race,
sex, and ethno-religious prejudices.
On the other hand, the armed forces' "don't ask, don't tell" policy is
distinguishable from the Colorado initiative struck down in Evans, as it is no legal
novelty and is less sweeping in the disability it imposes on gay people. More
59. Wardle, supra note 54, at 852-57, 865-66.
60. Ball & Pea, supra note 54.
61. See, e.g., Carole Jenny et al.,Are Children atRiskfor SexualAbuse by Homosexuals?,
94 PEDIATRICS 41 (1994).
62. See EDwARD 0. LAuMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRAcCES rIN Tm UNIrrED STATES 98-99 (1994).
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important, the institutional context makes the animus argument cut both ways: the
armed forces maintain that antigay prejudice stimulated by the presence of openly
gay service personnel would be disabling to the morale and unit cohesion needed
for an effective military. If Evans is read to question hysterical, narcissistic, and
obsessional feelings against gay people as the basis for invading gay people's
privacy or discriminating against them in the public sector, it does not necessarily
require the state to disregard such feelings when the state thrusts young people into
a totalizing setting where they are required to eat, sleep, and shower together. Thus,
the armed forces has a more robust argument for its antigay policies than other state
agencies have. Judicial deference to military judgments, especially as relates to
matters of morale and combat effectiveness, greatly strengthen the argument.
C. DOMA and No Promo Homo
Evans is also a starting rather than concluding point for thinking about state
statutes or agency rules prohibiting classroom or other state discussion that either
"promotes" homosexuality or depicts it as a "positive alternative life-style."'63 Like
Colorado's Amendment 2, such policies are an unusual and recent innovation,
targeting gay people as a class and having a potentially vicious effect on gay
adolescents in particular.64 Still, such statutes might pass Evans muster, if they are
viewed as not depriving gay people of important protections and instead, as,
directing state expression in the field of education, where the Supreme Court has
said that the state may "inculcate" its vision of the good life.65 As in the military
cases, courts might defer to parental homophobia (which is often the basis for no
promo homo policies in schools) because of the special constitutional status of the
parent-child relationship.
A particularly hard case is presented by the federal Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA")," which provides that more than 1000 federal statutory provisions
involving marriage or spousehood can never be construed to include same-sex
couples. If a state recognizes same-sex marriage, DOMA might be vulnerable to
Evans attack, because it denies those couples an extraordinary range of rights and
obligations normally accorded other married couples, involves the federal
government in micromanaging family formation issues traditionally left to the states,
and might be characterized, as congressional opponents did, as premature and
63. ARi. REV. STAT.ANN. § 15-716(CX1X2) (West Supp. 1998). For other policies to similar
effect, see NATIONAL ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, SEXUALITY
EDUCATIONINAmpRICA:ASTATE-BY-STATEREVIEW (1995).
64. See Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S TASKFORCE ON SUICIDE 110 (1989); Donna L Dennis &
Ruth E. Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to Education, 4 YALE L. &PoL'Y REv. 446, 448-52
(1986), see alsoNabozy v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (school refused to protect gay
students from antigay violence, despite repeated pleas).
65. Bethel Sch. Dist No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). Schools have authority to
"teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order," including broad prohibitions of
"lewd, indecent, or offensive speech." Id. at 683.
66. See 28 U.S.CA. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998).
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unnecessary legislation seeking to scapegoat gay people.67 On the other hand, the
arguments made by DOMA supporters generally lacked the hysterical and
obsessional flavor of the arguments made by the proponents of the Colorado
initiative and of presumptions against gay parental rights. While some supporters
spoke of same-sex marriage in apocalyptic terms,68 the key supporters made
arguments such as this: "Should the law express its neutrality between homosexual
and heterosexual relationships? ...Should this Congress tell the children of
America that it is a matter of indifference whether they establish families with a
partner of the opposite sex or cohabit with someone of the same sex?"69 The gap
between the opponents' perceptions and the supporters' arguments exposes deep
issues of equal protection law.
The no promo homo rationale of DOMA and other policies is that, even if the
state does not consider gay people criminals and is willing to employ openly gay
people, the state should be free to express its own republican vision of a happily
and heterosexually married society. Rather than compulsory heterosexuality, the
intolerant stick-like Hardwick policy, or even the closet-based policy of "don't ask,
don't tell," the state ought to be free to adopt a policy of preferred heterosexuality,
a more tolerant, carrot-like policy. Senator Dan Coats made this precise distinction
in the DOMA debates: "[W]hen we prefer traditional marriage and family in our
law, it is not intolerance. Tolerance does not require us to say that all lifestyles are
morally equal."70 As Justice Scalia's Evans dissent emphasized, one of Colorado's
justifications for the initiative was its signal of the community's belief that
heterosexuality is better and more normal than homosexuality as an orientation.
Although the Court did not accept this justification as a rational basis for the
initiative, it did not dispute or even recognize it either. Thus, another way that
Evans could be narrowed is that the state cannot penalize gay people for being out
of the closet, and perhaps cannot take away local protections either, but is free to
encourage people-especially the proverbial wavering adolescent-to be straight.
But surely the state cannot encourage people to feel attraction only for those of their
own race. If not, why can the state encourage people to feel attraction only for those
of the "opposite" sex?
This question poses one issue Evans ducked and an equally important issue not
presented in Evans. As to the first: Should sexual orientation, like race and sex, be
viewed as a (quasi) suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny, whereby
an antigay rule must narrowly serve a compelling or substantial state interest? For
the reasons advanced by Judge William Norris a decade ago, the Supreme Court's
precedents, especially the sex discrimination cases, could justify treating sexual
orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.7 The Supreme Court has
67.See, e.g., 142 CoNG.REc. S10065-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer); id. at H6400-01
(1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); id. at H1147-03 (1996) (statement of Rep. Frank).
68. See, e.g., ia at1H7441-03 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr); id. at H7480-05 (statement of
Rep. Buyer).
69. Id at H7480-05 (1996) (statement ofRep. Canady). The most eloquent articulation of this
idea was by Representative Henry Hyde. See id. at H7480-05.
70.Id. at H110114 (1996).
71. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn en banc,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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found sex and other classifications questionable, because they so frequently bear no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, are typically motivated by
stereotypical rather than fact-based thinking, and pervasively affect classes of
citizens traditionally subjected to legal disabilities." Gaylegal history suggests a
prima facie case for sexual orientation classifications to fit this mold.
Scientists have found no basis for believing that a homosexual orientation has any
correlation with fundamental personal traits such as intelligence, honesty,
psychological stability, or ability to cooperate with others.73 That sexual orientation
classifications almost never serve neutral state goals is illustrated by the rocky
history of such classifications. Gender-bending or homosexuality has been used as
a classification to determine who can enter the country and become a citizen, what
books can be published and read, who can be served in bars, who can be a state
employee or be licensed as a teacher, and what movies can be seen-all policies
that were hysterically motivated, honored in the breach, and ultimately repealed.74
Even the most notable surviving policy, the military exclusion, survives mainly
through the grace of the federal courts' extraordinarily deferential approach to
military decisionmaking.
Some judges and commentators have urged, unpersuasively, that suspect
classifications should be immutable.75 This is an unfortunate attempt to say that in
72. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973) (plurality opinion). For the
Court's similar methodology when evaluating other classifications, see City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (disabilities); Pler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216-17 n.14 (1982) (children of noncitizens); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)
(nonmarital birth); andMassachusettsBoard ofRetirementv. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (per curiam)
(1976) (age).
73. See, e.g., ALFRED C. KINsEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948);
ALFRED C. KINSEY ETAL., SEXuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953); Evelyn Hooker,
Male Homosexuality in theRorschach, 22 J.PRoEcTvE TECHNIQUES 33 (1958); Evelyn Hooker,
The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. PNomTnvE TEcHNIQuEs 18 (1957);
Sigmund Freud, Letter to an American Mother (1935) (quoted in EsxRIDGE & HuNTER, supra
note 2, at 143-44). Modem authorities are collected in HOMOSExUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
FORPUBLICPOLICY (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991), and HOMOSExUALrrY
IssuEs, supra note 55. For accounts from disciplines traditionally hostile to homosexuality, see
KENNETH LEWES, THE PsYCHOANALYric THEORY OF MALE HOMOSExuALITY (1988), and
MICHAELRusHOMOSEXUALrrY:APHILOPHICAL INQUIRY (1988). For accounts from different
perspectives of sexual and gender variation across time and cultures, see CLELLAN S. FORD &
FRANKA. BEACH,PATrERNS OF SEXUALBEHAviOR(1951); POsNER, supra note 40, at 291-323;
THE MANY FACEs OF HoMosxuALrTY: ANTROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HOMOsEXUAL
BEHAVIOR (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986); and RITUALIZED HOMOSEXUALITY IN MELANESIA
(Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1984).
74. See Eskridge, supra note 25, at 959-60 (discussing the decline and fall of antigay sodomy
and solicitation laws, cross-dressing ordinances, restrictions on assembly and association in bars
and college campuses, censorship of literature and erotica, immigration and naturalization policies).
75. The immutability criterion is cogently criticized and rejected for equal protection purposes
in Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 923-32 (1989), and Edward Stein, The Relevance of
Scientific Research About Sexual Orientation to Lesbian and Gay Rights, in GAY ETHIcs:
CoNTRovERsIEs IN OUrING, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND SExuAL ScIENcE 269 (Timothy Murphy ed.,
1994).
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all areas where we have a choice we can make political decisions to reward or
punish. Although sex is considered an immutable characteristic, people can conceal
their sex, and transsexuals often change their sex. Religion is often mutable and can
be easily concealed. Sex, religion, ethnicity, and for many people race (all suspect
classifications) are more mutable than nonsupect classifications such as age,
intelligence, and most forms of disability. To the extent there is an immutability
element in suspect classification law, "a trait [is] effectively immutable if changing
it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a
traumatic change of identity."76 In any event, scientists agree that sexual orientation
is a characteristic formed early in one's life, and the person has little control over
this feature of her or his identity."
In deciding which classifications should be suspect, the Supreme Court has
sometimes considered the extent to which the classifications have been used to
persecute particular groups in American history.7 This is always a retrospective
inquiry, where persecution is "discovered" only after a group has started to assert
itself politically. Gay people fit this pattern perfectly: symbolically excluded in
various ways from citizenship and sporadically persecuted, gay people have since
the 1960s mobilized as a political group and have made progress in both courts and
legislatures. Many old discriminations, and some new ones, remain on the books.
They are an irritant to a healthy pluralism and should be subjected to the same sort
of critique the Court has shown to sex-based discriminations.
Although sexual orientation fits the traditional criteria for heightened scrutiny, the
Court is not eager to add a new category to the list. Indeed, the double standard
itself makes less sense today, because antidiscrimination law is choking on a
plethora of prejudices. The discourse of prejudice is no longer the province of
racism and antisemitism and includes not only sexism and homophobia, but also
weightism and lookism, distaste for the disabled, ageism, accent discrimination,
stereotypes about people from Appalachia and the South-all of which are legally
regulated in many municipalities and some state and federal rules. Prejudice is not
only multivocal but universal and even commonplace. The prejudiced person is no
longer just the alien Nazi or the cloaked Klan member, but middle-class you and
me. This popularization has cost prejudice some of its ability to appall. No longer
is prejudice simply pathological or even completely dysfunctional; the bigot's
prejudices may help her or him to form a stable identity (narcissistic prejudices),
cope with economic marginality (obsessional prejudices), and even feel good about
herself or himself (hysterical prejudices). This phenomenon may undermine the
Carolene equal protection formulation, which is centrally concerned with prejudice.
The pervasiveness of prejudice would render the Carolene justification for judicial
activism potentially all-embracing, which would generate strong tensions with
constitutional precepts of representative democracy. And as a practical matter the
Court cannot monitor all forms of prejudice. It must choose which prejudices to
76. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1347.
77. See AL BE..TAL., S uALPREiERENcE: ITs DEVEL PmENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 186-
90 (1981); RICHARD GREEN, TWm "Sissy Boy" SYNDROME AND THE DEvELOPMENT OF
HOMoSExUALrrY 370-98 (1987); PosNER, supra note 40, at 101-08.
78. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,685-86 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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monitor because of their bad social consequences, perhaps even recognizing that
prejudice will often be rational for individuals but not for society as a whole. This
reality might impede the Court from recognizing sexual orientation as a new suspect
classification, but not from giving Evans-like teeth to the rational basis
approach-nor from deploying the Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence to
support homo equality. The second issue raised by DOMA is whether sex-based
classifications aimed at excluding gay people must necessarily be subjected to
heightened scrutiny even if sexual orientation classifications are not.
II. THE SEx DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR HOMO
EQUALITY
Formally, some of the discriminations that most affect gay people are those that
classify by sex, rather than sexual orientation. Thus, homosexuals can marry in all
states, so long as they marry someone of the opposite sex, for people of the same
sex generally cannot marry. Similarly, in six states, anyone gay or straight can
engage in sodomy, so long as the partner is of a different-sex. Although such
statutory schemes mainly affect gay people, the regulatory classification is sex-
based.
In the early 1970s, a challenge to these sex discriminations took shape from
arguments posed by lesbian feminists and male antifeminists, otherwise working at
cross-purposes. The Radicalesbians argued that patriarchy was the common enemy
of both liberated women and liberated homosexuals, because heterosexuality is a
practice that insists upon women's dependence upon men. Synthesizing this
philosophy and giving it a memorable tag, Adrienne Rich declared that "compulsory
heterosexuality," society's insistence that everyone be heterosexual, is a "profound
falseness," a lie that distorts the lives of all women.79
At the same time, opponents of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA")
were articulating the so-called "miscegenation analogy" as a basis for fearing that
the ERA would require judicial recognition of same-sex marriage. Professor Paul
Freund testified that "'if the law must be as undiscriminating toward sex as it is
toward race, it would follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the
same sex would be as invalid as laws forbidding miscegenation.' °8 0 Freund's
position was based upon Loving's holding that denying a black-white couple a
marriage license is race discrimination, because the classification, the regulatory
variable, is the race of one partner. Analogously, denying a female-female couple
a marriage license is sex discrimination, because the classification, the regulatory
variable, is the sex of one partner. Echoing Freund, ERA opponents in Congress
and in state ratification debates argued that the ERA would invalidate state sodomy
79. Rich, supra note 37, at 23-75. For other articulations, see SuzANm PHARR, FOMOPHOBIA
A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988); TI-GRACE ATKINSON, AMAZON ODYSSEY (1974); Anne Koedt,
Lesbianism and Feminism, in RADICAL FE1aINsM 246 (Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973); and
Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified Woman, in id. at 240. See also AMAZON EXPEDITION: A
LESBIAN FEmINIST ANTHOLOGY (Phyllis Birkby et al. eds., 1973); FOR LESBIANS ONLY: A
SEPARATISTANTHOLOGY (Sarah Lucia-Hoagland & Julia Penelope eds., 1988).
80. 118 CONo. REC. 9315 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (quoting Prof. Freund).
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laws and require states to recognize homosexual marriages, a charge disputed by
ERA sponsor, Senator Birch Bayh.8 '
Freund's prediction and lesbian feminist hopes did not materialize. Even though
almost a third of the states adopted equal rights amendments and the Supreme Court
interpreted the equal protection Glause to subject sex-based classifications to
intermediate scrutiny after 1976, the argument that denying same-sex couples
marriage licenses is sex discrimination was decisively rejected in Singer v. Haral
and then was abandoned for a half-generation. In at least one leading case, the sex
discrimination argument was used to challenge a sodomy law. Missouri's law only
criminalizes same-sex sodomy. The defendant in State v. Walsh83 argued that his
solicitation of oral sex was illegal only because he had solicited it from a man, not
from a woman. 4 This was rank sex discrimination. Echoing Senator Bayh and
Singer, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the statute "applie[d] equally to men
and women because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual activity with
members of their own sex.""5
Given the law's uniform rejection of the sex discrimination argument for homo
equality, law professors as well as litigators gave up on it-until 1988, when Sylvia
Law and Andrew Koppelman revived the argument.86 Law linked society's
stigmatizing sexual deviance with its insistence upon maintaining women in
traditional roles as wife, mother, and man's helper. Koppelman revived Freund's
miscegenation analogy, but in support of sodomy repeal and same-sex marriage
rather than in opposition to women's rights. The sex discrimination argument for
homo equality assumed new relevance with the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
in Baehr v. Lewin that the state's refusal to issue a marriage license to Ninia Baehr
and Genora Dancel and two other couples was sex discrimination that requires
compelling state justification to survive the state's ERA. 7 In light of Baehr, the
argument deserves a fresh look. My look will be critical as well as constructive.
Once they grasp the sex discrimination argument for homo equality, the
immediate reaction of lawyers is: This is a trick argument! It has to be wrong!
Consider one way of criticizing the argument and its miscegenation analogy. Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Loving emphasized that Virginia's rule against
different-race marriages subserved a regime of "White Supremacy," which was
antithetical to the core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Singer avoided the
miscegenation analogy by limiting Loving to cases where an invidious classification
81. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583-84 (1973).
Compare 118 CONG. RFc. at 9315 (Sen. Ervin, invoking Freund to oppose ERA), with id. at
9320-9321 (Sen. Bayh, disputing Freund's analysis).
82. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct App. 1974).
83.713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
84. See id. at 510.
85. Id. at 510.
86. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 187; Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation
Analogy: SodomyLaw as SexDiscrimination, 98 YALEL.J. 145 (1988).
87. 852 P.2d 44, 65 (Haw. 1993), on remand sub nom. Baehr v. hMlike, CIV. No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (on appeal as of May 1, 1999).
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is used to suppress a group whose identity is defined by that classification.8 Baehr,
which rejected Singer, may not be a sex discrimination case in the same way Loving
is a race discrimination case. The classification in Baehr is sex, but the class being
disadvantaged is defined by sexual orientation (gay people) and not by sex
(women). The philosophy that justifies their disadvantage is compulsory
heterosexuality, not simple sexism. Table 1 maps the differences among the cases
as critics might read them.
TABLE 1
Classification Disadvantaged Philosophical
Class Target
Loving Race Racial Minorities Racism
ERA Sex Women Sexism
Baehr Sex Sexual Orientation Compulsory
I Heterosexuality
Note immediately that the middle column is misleading. In Loving, the
disadvantaged class is "miscegenosexuals," Sam Marcosson's term for people who
fall in love with someone of another race."9 Many African Americans did not favor
different-race marriage in 1967, and many disfavor it now. Racial minorities were
disadvantaged by the classification only by reasoning from the underlying ideology,
racism. Hence, the middle column in Loving reflects an indirect reasoning process
rather than direct harm. The ERA line must be qualified in the same way. In Craig
v. Boren, the case that established sex is a quasi-suspect classification, the
disadvantaged group was eighteen- to twenty-one year-old males who were denied
the right to buy low-alcohol beer that eighteen to twenty-one year-old females
enjoyed. Subjecting the sex-based classification to heightened scrutiny, the
Supreme Court emphasized that sex-based classifications ostensibly benefiting
women are just as objectionable as those ostensibly benefiting men when they
reflect "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather
than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas."'" When traditional gender stereotypes
animate a sex-based classification, women as a group suffer, at least indirectly.
Again, the second column only reflects indirect harm, deriving from the underlying
philosophy (sexism) and not from the classification in a particular case (women can
buy drinks earlier than men).
To make the miscegenation analogy complete, however, one must show that
denying a same-sex couple a marriage license subserves a regime of sexism which
is antithetical to the core purpose of a state ERA or of the Fourteenth Amendment
88. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
89. Samuel Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Tide VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (1992).
90. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975)).
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as interpreted in Craig. If such a showing could be made, then Baehr would fit the
Craig model and would be perfectly analogous to Loving, as reflected in Revised
Table 1. Parentheses are used for the middle column, in order to suggest that the
disadvantaged class is based upon inference from the underlying philosophy.
REVISED TABLE 1
Classification . Disadvantaged Philosophical
Class Target
Loving Race Miscegenosexuals Racism
(Racial Minorities)
Craig Sex 18- to 2 1-Year-Old Sexism
Males (Women)
Baehr Sex Gay Couples Sexism
(Women)
Under Revised Table 1, Baehr would be the same as Craig and analytically
indistinguishable from Loving.
The same kind of argument could also be made against same-sex only sodomy
laws. Following Singer, the Missouri court in Walsh held that, so long as male-male
and female-female sodomy were treated the same, there was no sex discrimination.9
This reasoning was rejected in the race context. In Pace v. Alabama,92 the Supreme
Court upheld a law criminalizing different-race sex on the ground that because each
race was treated the same there was no racediscrimination. But Pace was overruled
in McLaughlin v. Florida,93 where the Court struck down a statute prohibiting lewd
cohabitation between different-race couples only. The defendants, a black-white
couple, would not have violated the law if they had been a cohabiting white-white
couple. The Supreme Court held this was race discrimination, because the
classification, the regulatory variable, was the race of one of the partners.94 Under
the reasoning ofMcLaughlin, Walsh is as incorrect as Singer. Table 2 captures the
race analogy for same-sex sodomy laws.
91. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508,510 (Mo. 1986) (en bane).
92. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
93.379 U.S. 184 (1967).
94. See id. at 195.
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TABLE 2
Classification Disadvantaged Philosophical
Class Target
McLaughlin Race Miscegenosexuals Racism
(Racial Minorities)
Craig Sex 18- to 21-Year-Old Sexism
Males (Women)
Walsh Sex Gay Couples Sexism
I _(Women)
The remainder of this Part will consider the relationship between these antigay
exclusions and sexism along lines of constitutional doctrine, the (legal) history of
sexuality and gender, and the theory of multivocal prejudices.
A. Compulsory Procreation and Rigid Gender Roles
A majority of the Supreme Court now seems committed to the proposition that
any classification based on sex that insists on rigid gender roles requires an
exceedingly persuasive state justification under the Equal Protection Clause. As
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it for the Court in the United States v. Virginia,
the VM case ("VMP'), when the state controls "gates to opportunity," it "may not
exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females."'"5 Justice John Paul Stevens has added:
"Discrimination that is 'merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of
thinking about females' is unacceptable."" The Court's skepticism about sex-based
classifications subserving traditional gender roles would likely extend to the
judiciaries of any state (such as Hawaii) having an equal rights amendment to its
state constitution, and to most other states as well.
American law regulating sexuality and sexual unions has traditionally been
gendered, and in a very simple way: women cannot have sex outside of procreative
penis-vaginal sex in marriage to a man, and men cannot have sex outside of
procreative penile-vaginal sex in marriage to a woman. State law in the colonial
95. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,541 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982)); see Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1445-46 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment joined by Kennedy, J.); id. at 1449-55 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Breyer and Souter, J.).
96. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment)).
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era97 and in the nineteenth centurys made it a serious crime for unmarried men and
women to have penile-vaginal sex (fornication) or anal sex (sodomy); marriage
rendered any kind of penile-vaginal sex legal and indeed rendered forcible sex
immune from rape laws; the sexual crimes a married man could commit were
penile-vaginal sex with a woman (adultery) or girl (seduction) not his wife, or anal
sex (sodomy) with his wife, another woman or girl, or a male. Once contraception,
abortion, and oral sex came to be more commonly practiced, as means of sexual
pleasure without the risk of pregnancy, states adopted new laws making those
practices illegal as well (1850-1.920).-" This regime of criminal laws was gendered
to the core, directly reflecting the Roman Catholic and Puritan natural law
philosophy: Sex is bad unless practiced in a procreative way (penis in a vagina)
within the institution of male-female marriage; the role of a woman is to receive the
sperm of a man, become impregnated, and bear and raise the child; the role of the
man is to impregnate the woman and rule over the household formed as children are
borne.
This century has seen a relaxation of the natural law regime. Many of its gendered
features have been repealed or invalidated, including the complete exemption for
rapes within marriage, the wife's lack of independent legal rights, and prohibitions
of abortion and the distribution of contraceptives. Some of the antisex features have
been repealed in some but not all states, including the crimes of fornication,
adultery, and sodomy.' Although state law no longer makes procreation the
linchpin of marriage, it does continue to refuse to recognize marriages between two
women or two men, a discrimination based on the sex of one of the partners that
"exclude[s] qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females"""' or, at the very least, is a "byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about females."' 2 Sodomy laws indirectly reflect the
same regime, as they center sexual expression around pregnancy-based penile-
vaginal intercourse; laws prohibiting only same-sex sodomy directly instantiate a
gendered regime whereby women can only have sex with men. In short, these sex-
based classifications strongly originated in and continue to serve the kind of rigid
gender stereotyping that the Supreme Court criticized in VMI and other cases.
Indeed, the policy against allowing two women to marry is driven by a more
obvious insistence upon traditional gender roles than the policy of allowing
97. For colonial era documents, see JONATHANNED KATz, GAY/LESBLANALmANAc 23-133
(1983).
98. For mid-nineteenth century state criminal law relating to sex, see, for example, 2 JoEL
PRENnSs BIsHoP, COMMENTARiEs ON THE CRnMIALLAw § 1127 (1858); 2 JOSEPH CHnrrY,A
PRACrICAL TREATns ON CRImNAL LAW 48-50 (5th amended ed. 1847); and FRANCIS WHARTON,
A TREATISE ON CRINmqAL LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 2267 (1852).
99. This process is traced in Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective
onAbortion Regulation and Questions ofEqualProtection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (anti-
abortion legislation, 1850 onward), and Eskridge, supra note 28 (criminalization of oral sex, 1879-
1921).
100. For a relatively current survey of the various rules in place, see RICHARDA- POSNER &
KATHARmEB. Sm.sAUGH, AGUiDE TOAMERICA'S SEXLAwS (1996).
101. United Statesv. Virginia, 518U.S. 515,541 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982)).
102. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,223 (1977).
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eighteen-year-old women but not men to buy beer that was invalidated in Craig.
The requirements of Tables 1 (as revised) and 2 would appear to be satisfied.
The thoughtful reader might well believe that the syllogism is still too literal a
reading of the Court's precedents to bring sex-based marriage and sodomy rules
within respectable sex discrimination law. A central doctrinal objection might be
grounded upon the Court's recognition that "inherent differences" between men and
women can justify sex-based rules." 3 Indeed, the argument that has usually
prevailed in the same-sex marriage challenges is that marriage naturally and
inevitably involves a man and a woman, because their biological differences make
them congenial opposites that nonetheless attract. The Minnesota Supreme Court
in Baker v. Nelson,' the first reported decision rejecting a legal challenge to the
same-sex marriage bar, began its constitutional discussion with the premise that
"[tihe institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children... is as old as the book of Genesis."0 5 Baker
was followed by every court to address the issue, until Baehr. Yet its factual
assertions are explicitly gendered, and factually erroneous besides. 0 "
The natural law conception of marriage that Baker adopted is itself sexist, as it
practically and by some accounts necessarily relegates women to traditional roles
stereotypically assigned to women: wife, mother, homemaker. These gendered roles
are precisely the ones reflected in the law's traditional persecution of lesbians,
where the standard reproach has been that women should stay in their place-in the
home, at the side of a man. Allowing two women to get married would undermine
the gendered nature of marriage, because at least one of the women (and usually
both) would assume the traditional male role of breadwinner. Thus, when Ninia
Baehr and Genora Dancel were denied a marriage license by Hawaii, the State was
reasserting traditional gender roles. When the Court has invoked the inherent
differences doctrine to acquiesce in a sex-based classification, it has generally been
a classification which opens up new opportunities for or benefits women. According
to the VMi decision, the doctrine is not applicable to rules that were adopted "for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity."'0 7
A deeper, yet perhaps more obvious, objection is that sexuality and gender are
simply different. Gaylaw should not leech off of sex discrimination jurisprudence.
103. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (citing cases).
104. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Mnn. 1971).
105. Id. at 186. For cases citingBaker as authority, seeJonesv. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
589 (Ky. 1973), and Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). As Baker's
reference to Genesis reflectsjudges rejecting same-sex marriage have also relied upon the nation's
religious heritage. See Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C.
Super. Ct, June 2,1992) (quoting passages from Genesis, Deuteronomy, Matthew, and Ephesians
to support its holding that "societal recognition that it takes a man and a woman to form a marital
relationship is older ... than Christianity itself), aff'd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Adams v.
Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119,1123 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1983).
106. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CAsE FOR SAME-SEx MARRIAGE: FROM SExuAL
LmERTY TO CvmLizED CoMMrTmENT ch. 2 (1996).
107. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (citing cases). Possible exceptions include proof of paternity
cases and the full statutory rape case. After VM and Miller v. Albright, it is not clear that either
line of cases retains viability.
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Why should gay men benefit from a jurisprudence designed to put women on an
equal plane with men? Admittedly, the sex discrimination argument for homo
equality has a transvestic quality, dressing up gay rights in sex equality garb. But,
as feminist and lesbian-feminist writers have long maintained, antihomosexual
attitudes are connected with attitudes sequestering women in traditional gender
roles.
Social science studies of male homophobia emphasize a correlation between
antihomosexual feelings and "a belief in the traditional family ideology, i.e.,
dominant father, submissive mother, and obedient children," as well as "traditional
beliefs about women, e.g., that it is worse for a woman to tell dirty jokes than it is
for a man."' A few studies claim a causal link" [A] major determinant of negative
attitudes toward homosexuality is the need to keep males masculine and females
feminine, that is, to avoid sex-role confusion."" 9 The Kinsey Institute published a
thorough survey of Americans' attitudes about sex and sexuality, using
sophisticated statistical analyses in 1989. These researchers found that one variable
significantly linked to antihomosexual feelings was the respondents' own fears and
anxieties about the opposite sex. The researchers believe that people who feel
threatened by the opposite sex will be hostile to homosexuality as a defense
mechanism, displacing an identity-shattering fear onto a socially safe object
(gender-bending queers). "'Accordingly, we may condemn the homosexual in order
to reduce sex role confusion.' 0 These empirical points must, however, be
understood against the backdrop of the complicated history, including the legal
history, of sexuality and gender role in the last century or so.
B. Historical Connections Between Gender Stereotyping
and Compulsory Heterosexuality
As I have shown above, traditional natural law regulation of sexuality was closely
tied to procreative penile-vaginal intercourse within marriage. The historical
process by which that regime eroded in the face of feminist demands generated both
108. Stephen Morin & Ellen Garfinkle, Male Homophobia, 34 J. Soc. IssuEs, 29, 31 (1978);
see Mary Laner & Roy Laner, Sexual Preference or Personal Style? Why LesbiansAre Disliked,
5 J. HoMos=xUALTY 339 (1980); Mary Laner & Roy Laner, Personal Style or Sexual
Preference? Why Gay Men Are Disliked, 9 INT'L REV. MOD. Soc'Y 215 (1979); see also
Koppelman, supra note 86, at 238 & n.157 (citing numerous studies discussing the "correlation
between conventional expectations about gender roles and hostility toward homosexuals").
109. A.P. MacDonald & Richard Games, Some Characteristics of Those Who Hold Positive
and Negative Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, 1 J. HoMosExuALrY 9, 19 (1974); see also
Kathryn N. Black & Michael R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Self-Reported Sex-Role
Characteristics and Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, in BASHERS, BAlmRs AND BiGoTs:
HoMOPHOBIA INAMvERCAN SOCiETY 83 (John DeCeeco ed., 1985).
110. ALBERT D. KLASSEN ET AL., SEX AND MORALITY N THE U.S.: AN EMPtIRCAL ENQUIRY
UNDERTmAuspICES OF Tim INSEY INSTTUT 241 (1989) (quoting A.P. MacDonald, Jr. et al.,
Attitudes Toward Homosexuality: Preservation of Sex Morality or the Double Standard? 40 J.
CoNsuLTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 161 (1973)).
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the modem idea of gender role and the modem conception of the homosexual.' As
an increasing number of women became socially and economically independent of
men in the nineteenth century, bourgeois male culture reacted, directly, by
suppressing women's aspirations and controlling women's bodies and, indirectly,
by creating "the homosexual" as an object of special scorn. Setting up the
effeminate man as the antithesis of manhood, men were reassured of their own
superior virility. Setting up the lesbian as an object to be feared, men asserted their
central role in women's lives. The creation of homosexuals as a despised class
reinforced the gender norms of male superiority and control. In short, there is a
historical as well as logical connection between compulsory gender binarism, the
idea that men must be masculine and women must be feminine, and compulsory
heterosexuality, the idea that sexuality must consist of a man having sex with a
woman. Indeed, the idea of rigid gender lines logically and historically preceded the
idea of compulsory heterosexuality.
Much of the new discourse of gender and sexuality was medical in nature. The
leading sexologist of the late nineteenth century was Richard von Krafft-Ebing,
whose Psychopathia Sexualis rearticulated old natural law ideas in new
medicalized terms of gender binarism. His starting premise was that men are
sexually aggressive, sensual, and public-oriented, while women are sexually
passive, spiritual, and family-oriented."' Krafl-Ebing's project was to catalogue
sexual "pathologies," or dysfunctions, including "antipathic sexuality." There were
several stages of antipathic sexuality: (1) the physically normal person who has
homosexual tendencies, whereby she or he is attracted to those of her or his own
sex but plays a role appropriate to her or his gender (submissive female, insertive
male); (2) thepsychic invert, who assumes the psychological characteristics of the
opposite sex and prefers to play an inverted role in intercourse (the inverted male
enjoys submission, the inverted female aggression); and (3) the physical invert,
whose physiology resembles that of the opposite sex and who can only play an
inverted role in intercourse (probably hermaphrodites and other intersexuals)."
The pathology of "sexual inversion" was the individual's departure from traditional
gender roles. Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion, which popularized these ideas in
the English-speaking world, explicitly made a connection between women's
increased freedom and homosexuality: Not only was the lesbian psychically gender-
111. The historiography that has most influenced my thinking in what follows is, especially,
CARROLL SMrrH-ROSENBERG, DIsoRDERLY CoNDuCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VIcTORIAN
AMERIcA (1985); John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in PowERs OF DEsIRE: THE
POLITICS OF SEXuALrrY 100 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983); E.ANTHONYROTUNDO,AMERUcAN
MANHOOD: TRANSFORMATIONS IN MAsCULINrrY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO TmE MODERN ERA
(1993); and LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANIC FRIENDsHIP AND
LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT (1981). For earlier
developments along these lines in Europe, see Randolph Trumbach, Gender and the Homosexual
Role inModern Western Culture: The 18th and 191h Centuries Compared, in HOMOSEXUALITY,
WHICH HOMOsExuALrrY? 149,153 (Dennis Altman et al. eds., 1989).
112. RICHARDVONKRA*W-EBwNo, PSYCHOPATIIASHxuALIS, wTH SPECIAL REPERENCE TO THE
ANTIPATHIC SEXUAL INsTINCT: A MEDICO-FORENSIC STUDY 14 (F.. Rebman trans., Physicians
& Surgeons Book Co. 1931) (1899), quoted and contextualized in ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra
note 2, at 136-41.
113. See KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 112, at 54-55,382-83.
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inverting, but feminism was contributing to sexual inversion by encouraging women
to go out in the world."14 Reflecting a stronger ongoing influence of natural law
thinking, American doctors were even more dogmatic about the connection between
gender-bending and sexual inversion than Krafft-Ebing and Ellis." 5
American law reflected and may have contributed to the many-layered connection
between gender inversion and what came to be known as sexual deviance, even
before the sexologists developed their theories. The best examples are the pervasive
laws against disguise and cross-dressing." 6 Although the earliest laws, enacted in
the period surrounding the Civil War, were aimed in part at gender fraud, women
passing as men, they also struck directly at gender inversion, men as well as women
abandoning their gender costumes. In a final regulatory move, such laws came to
be enforced to regulate sexual inversion before the turn of the century. In cities
such as Boston, Nashville, New York, and San Francisco, the female impersonator
and mannish lesbian were put in jail under disguise statutes, not because anyone
was fooled, but because their costumes rejected their gender role and reflected their
deviant sexual tastes, which contemporaries viewed as a single crime against
bourgeois male society. Famous cross-dressing criminals included Jeanne Bonnet,
the San Francisco cross-dresser who organized a band of man-renouncing
prostitutes in the 1870s; Alice Mitchell, a Memphis socialite who loved another
woman and proposed to dress as a man to obtain a license to marry her in 1892;
Ralph Werther, a female impersonator who cavorted on the streets of New York in
the 1880s and 1890s; Elvira Mugarietta; the open cross-dresser of the 1890s who
completely masqueraded as a man after 1900; and the fairies of Newport, cross-
dressing sailors who tricked with male trade and with one another during World
War I-all came into conflict with the law's increasing concern with gender-
bending." 7 In the cases of Mitchell and the Newport sailors, their legal downfalls
were extensively chronicled by the press and galvanized citizens throughout the
country with the scandal, and for some the allure, of gender/sexual deviance.
The cross-dressing laws were only the most explicit legal enforcement of gender
binarism. More important, if indirect, enforcement came through antiprostitution
114. 2HAvmGcKELLs, STUDiS INTEPsYCHOLOGYOFSrC SEXUAL INVERSION 147-48 (F.A.
Davis Co. 1913) (1897).
115. See GEORGEU BEARD, S xuALNEuRASTBENiA ITS HYGmNE, CAUSES, SYMPTOMS, AND
TREATMENT (2d ed. 1886); G. Frank Lydston, ClinicalLecture: Sexual Perversion, Satpiasis and
Nymphomania, 61 MED. & SURGICAL REP. 253 (1889). For other early examples, see JoNATHAN
NED KATZ, GAY/LESBiANALMANAC: ANWDOCUvmNTARY (1983); and George Chauncey, Jr.,
From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of
Female Deviance, 58-59 SALMAGUNDI 114 (1982/83), reprinted in HoMosExuALrrY: SACRILEGE,
VIsION, PoLrrICs (Robert Boyers & George Steiner eds., 1982-83).
116. See Eskridge, American Regulation, supra note 48, at 1040-43; Nan D. Hunter, Gender
Disguise and the Law (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
117. See EARL LIND (Ralph Werther-Jenie June), AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ANANDROGYNE (Amo
Press 1975) (1918); LAWRENCE R. MURPHY, PERVERT BY OmCIAL ORDER: THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS BY'THE UNITED STATES NAvY (1988); Louis G. SULLIVAN, FROM
FEMALE TO MALE: TBE LE'E OF JACK B. GARLAND (1990); Lisa Duggan, The Trials ofAlice
Mitchell: Sensationalism, SexologV, and the Lesbian Subject in Turn-of-the-Century America,
18 SIGNS 791 (1993).
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and sodomy laws that were dynamically applied to sexual inverts."' In New York
City, the police and magistrates fashioned out of the prostitution cases a separate
category for "disorderly conduct-degeneracy," applicable to male inverts. The
regulatory category appropriated Krafft-Ebing's terminology for sexual inverts and
was apparently enforced primarily against female impersonators, like Werther. The
relationship between the prostitute and the sexual invert, suggested both in the laws
and their police enforcement, lay in their violation of rigid gender roles: The
entrepreneurial, sexualized prostitute and the mannish lesbian violated women's
role as passive and nurturing; the male invert, sensual and sexually receptive,
violated men's role as aggressive and sexually active. The period between the Civil
War and World War I, when same-sex intimacy became regulated, is also the period
when the states adopted statutes regulating women's ability to plan their
childbearing through contraception and abortion and to work outside the home and
in jobs on a par with men."9 Bo-drgeois male assertion of legal control over their
wives' bodies and potential careers was followed by their assertion of control over
other women and men who violated the cult of "true womanhood" and its gender
lines: prostitutes, fairies, and lesbians.
After 1880, for the first time in American history, sodomy laws were enforced in
northern, midwestern, and some western cities against more than one or two people
a year. 2 The pattern of enforcement changed in response to the new regulatory
discourse about degeneracy and inversion. Where virtually all of the reported pre-
1900 sodomy cases involved male aggression (anal sex, akin to rape) against a
more vulnerable person or animal, many of the post-1900 cases involved
consensual sex (oral sex) between two adults, typically two men.' When the state
imprisoned a man for soliciting or giving oral sex to another man, the state was no
longer punishing something akin to rape, but was punishing the gender inversion
of a man giving pleasure to another man. The Newport investigations fully reveal
the perceived connection between gender inversion and homosexuality by the end
of World War I. After the war, just as oral sex was booming among married
couples, it was more heavily policed than ever before among same-sex couples.
Compulsory heterosexuality became the policy, and it reflected a decisive shift from
disgusting acts to departure from gender role as the focus of regulatory concern.
Oral sex between husband and wife was no longer considered criminally disgusting;
between two consenting male adults, it could get you life in prison or, starting in the
193 Os, in a mental hospital.
The cultural impulse to reaffirm traditional gender lines is only a fragment of the
story, however. Fear of uncontrolled (male) sexuality, not just insistence on strict
gender binarism, played an important role in the law's harsher focus on same-sex
intimacy. The shift in regulatory emphasis was from the psychic or physical "invert"
and."degenerate" to the "homosexual" and the sexual "pervert."'2 This reflected
118. See EskridgeAmerican Regulation, supra note 48, at 1025-32,1043-45.
119. See Siegel, supra note 99, at 282.
120. See EskridgeAmerican Regulation, supra note 48, at 1110-11 & app.1.
121. See Eskridge, supra note 28.
122. See Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath,
1920-1960, 74 J.AM. IhsT. 83,94, 103 (1987).
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an intellectual shift from the philosophy of Krafft-Ebing to the philosophy of
Sigmund Freud or, more precisely, to the weird synthesis of their theories
accomplished by the American Freudians in the 1910s and 1920s. M Although
Freud's theories reflect traditional gender concepts, their focus was the
development of "normal" sexuality, a critical part of one's personal identity.
Influenced by puritanical sex negativity, the American Freudians demonized
deviance from the norm, and American law treated deviants as sexual psychopaths,
persons whose impaired Freudian egos could not control their dangerous sexual
libidos. The "predatory homosexual" and the "vampire lesbian," foreshadowed in
American culture by World War I, were prominent in the generation afterward.
This Americanized version of Freud inspired prosecutors, legislators, policemen,
and judges from the 1920s onward. An early expression of this ideology, by an Ohio
judge, described "sexual perverts" as "wild ferocious animals." Justifying the
relaxation of the traditional rule against allowing evidence of other crimes in a
criminal prosecution, the judge said,
It is more or less a matter of common knowledge, among those who have made
a study of sexual perversion as it manifests itself in human degenerates, that each
sexual pervert follows some habitual, unnatural method of gratifying his
perverted passion. It may be unnatural commerce with one class of beasts or
another class of beasts; it may be by one mature male with another mature male;
and it may be, which is to-day [sic] of too frequent occurrence, a dynamic sexual
commerce with little boys or little girls. 24
As this excerpt makes clear, antihomosexual fears were linked to concerns about
child molestation, the greatest possible calamity in the Freudian universe, because
it was sure to unhinge the child's progression to normal heterosexuality. An
Oklahoma judge later put it this way:
"Exposure to the sex deviate may have a decisive and harmful effect upon a
child's development of a normal sex life as an adult. Despite their differences of
opinion, students of homosexuality seem to agree that exposure during
adolescence may be the precipitating factor in the adult development of the
homosexual or the Lesbian. The law must make it possible to take effective
action against twisted adults who use children and minors as sexual objects.""'
Antihomosexual policies developed during and after World War II, especially the
military exclusion, were responsive to multiple anxieties. This complexity is vividly
reflected in the War Department Inspector General's investigation of the Women's
Army Corps training camp at Fort Oglethorpe in the spring of 1944. The
investigators were unwilling to refer women to treatment as lesbians unless they
were persuaded that the women were homosexual in orientation and had engaged
in "unnatural acts" with one another and exhibited cross-gender characteristics,
123. See 1 NAnAN G. HALE, JR., FRFUD AND THE AmmcANs: Tim BEGINNINGs OF
PsYcHOANALYsIs IN TmE UNrrED STATES, 1876-1917 (1971), for a detailed account of the
American Freudians.
124. Barnett v. State, 135 N.E. 647,649 (Ohio 1922).
125. Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 565 n.1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) (quoting MoRRIs
PLOSCOWE, SEXAND THELAW (1951)).
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especially dressing or passing as a man.12 6 During the witch-hunt period from 1947
to 1961, lesbians as well as gay men were increasingly stigmatized as predatory
psychopaths, even as the gender inversion charge remained a powerful one. The
federal government's postwar exclusion of gay people from the civil service as well
as the armed service, emphasized the tendency of "homosexuals and other sex
perverts" to "entice normal individuals to engage in perverted practices," as the
1950 Hoey Subcommittee report put it. 2" Similar characterizations were made in
official federal justifications for excluding gay people, coded as "sexual
psychopaths," from entering the country and from becoming U.S. citizens."' On the
other hand, federal authorities continued to emphasize gender deviance as well,
particularly for women. Military training lectures in the early 1950s told female
recruits that "[t]he Creator has endowed the bodies of women with the noble
mission of motherhood and the bringing of human life into the world. Any woman
who violates this great trust by participating in homosexuality not only degrades
herself socially but also destroys the purpose for which God created her." Women
were warned that they "may ruin [their] chances for a happy marriage.... If a
woman gets entangled in homosexuality and is given an undesirable discharge or
a dishonorable discharge from the Navy, she finds herself cut off from acceptable
relationships with men and the companionship of normal women.129
The dual themes of gender inversion and sexual predation were also apparent in
the state manias and panics, such as the Boys of Boise panic in 1956-1957, the
Miami Hurricane of 1953-1954, and the New York and San Francisco Bar Wars of
1960-1961.3' For example, when Miami began its purge of "sex perverts and
degenerates" in 1953, local police officials specifically invoked images of male
"girlishness" and child molestation. "We intend to continue to harass those men
who affect female mannerisms in public places and let them know in no uncertain
terms that they are unwelcome on Miami Beach," said the police chief.1 ' During
the antihomosexual campaign, Miami adopted new ordinances making it a crime for
"female impersonators" to perform in the city (1952), "lesbians and homosexuals"
to congregate (1954), or for any person to cross-dress or engage in lewd behavior
126. See Report of Lieutenant Colonel Birge Holt and Captain Ruby Herman to the Acting
Inspector General (July 29,1944) (appendix oftestimony of Dr. Alice Rost), available atNational
Archives, Suitland, Maryland, Record Group 159 (office of the Army Inspector General), File No.
333.9 (Third WAC Training Center). The Report is described and quoted in Eskridge, American
Regulation, supra note 48, at 1092-93.
127. STAFF OFSUBCOM. ONINVEhIGAnONs OF THE SENATE Comm. ONxXPENDITURES IN THE
ExEcUTIvE DEP'TS, 81ST CONG., INTERIM REPORT ON EMPLoYvMNT op HoMosExuALs AND
OTmRSExPERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. Doe. No. 81-241, at4 (1950).
128.See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at24 (1950), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.CAN. 1653,1701;
S. REP. No. 82-1137, at 9 (1950).
129. Report ofthe Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recommendations to the Secretary
of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures and Directives Dealing with Homosexuals,
app. 23 (Chaplain's Presentation (WAVE Recruits)) at 2 (Dec. 21, 1956 to Mar. 15, 1957)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
130. See generally Eskridge, Privacy Jurisprudence, supra note 48, at 724-33.
131. Bureau ofPub. Info.,Miami Junks the Constitution, ON, INC., Jan. 1954, at 16, 19. For
similar rhetoric later in the antihomosexual campaign, see Lyn Pedersen, Miami Hurricane, ONE,
INC., Nov. 1954, at 6.
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(1956).132 By the late 1950s, however, when the Florida Legislation Investigating
Committee began its inquiries into homosexuality, the chief concern was predation.
As the committee said in its 1959 report, "The greatest danger of a homosexual is
his or her recruitment of other people into such practices."' 33 In other states, most
notably California, the image of the predatory female or male homosexual was most
galvanizing in the field of public education.
After 1961, the terror which put homosexuals constantly on the defensive slowly
turned to a thermidor, during which gay people were able to reclaim many of the
rights of citizenship. The effect of women's liberation on gay liberation was
complicated. On the one hand, the acceptance, even if partial, of equal rights for
women contributed to homo equality as well. Discriminated against first because
they were women and then because they were gay women, lesbians benefitted
directly from any policy protecting against sex discrimination. Laws against cross-
dressing were directly undermined by cultural acceptance of women's freedom to
wear comfortable men's clothing, which contributed to greater toleration for men
wearing dresses. The women's movement also facilitated a dramatic post-1969
reconfiguration of sodomy laws: At the same time gays were protesting state
harassment of same-sex intimacy, women were insisting upon more vigorous state
attention to female child molestation and rape; the result was a revolution in
sodomy law enforcement, from an emphasis on same-sex male intimacy, to an
emphasis on male-female rape or child molestation. Most of the connections were
less direct. Cities and states with populations favoring equality for women were not
only more likely to decriminalize same-sex intimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, but
also much more likely to adopt laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
in the 1970s and 1980s.1
34
On the other hand, antihomosexual arguments continued to be made, with
unabated passion but with new rhetorical emphases. The feminist movement
gradually discredited explicit appeals to rigid gender roles. Consequently, public
antigay rhetoric de-emphasized claims about gay people's gender inversion and
refocused on the assertedly sick, predatory nature of homosexuality. For example,
Anita Bryant's 1977 campaign to repeal Dade County's law prohibiting antigay
discrimination operated under the moniker "Save Our Children."'35 Rhetoric
supporting the armed forces exclusion made an even greater shift, presenting a
132. These ordinances are reproduced in Eskridge, Privacy Regulation, supra note 48, at 827-
28 app. 5.
133. FLORIDA LF-GISLATVE INVESTIGATION COMM., REPORT OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE
INVSIATING COMMITTEE TO THE 1959 SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 4-5, available at Florida
Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 1486, carton 1 (Tallahassee, Fla.); see also FLORiDA
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMM., HOMosExuALITy AND CrriENSI-ip IN FLORIDA 14 (1964)
("Mhe homosexual's goal... is to 'bring over' the young person."), available at Florida Dep't
of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 1486, carton I (Tallahassee, Fla.).
134. See JAMEs W. BLrTrON ET AL., PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CoNFLIcTs: BATILES OVER GAY
RIGHSm INAMRicA ColvOMtmuNmES 76-86 (1997) (noting that gay rights ordinances are most
likely found in cities with racial diversity, nontraditional households, and dominant religions that
do not emphasize women's roles as wives and mothers, and also noting that feminist groups are
especially key allies).
135. Jane S. Schachter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the United States, 29 HARV. C. R. -
C.L. L. REV. 283,284 nn.10-11 (1994).
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kinder, gentler, legalized version of the sexual predation argument: the privacy as
well as morale of straight soldiers would be threatened by the shower-room gaze
of openly gay comrades, which in turn threatens unit cohesion and the ability of the
armed forces to do its job. The shower-room argument reflects the continuing
power of American fears about sexuality. It also reflects the gendered nature of
those fears, as men are much more hysterical about being sexualized by the
homosexual gaze than women are. This is surely related to women's experience
with being sexualized already by straight men, whose gaze is overwhelmingly more
likely to be followed by a rape than the lesbian's gaze. The operation of the
exclusion is also gendered, as female service personnel have long been and
continue to be discharged at significantly higher rates than male personnel. This
might reflect a greater incidence of lesbians than gay men in the armed forces, but
it also reflects sexist assumptions about military service (man's work) and women's
place (if not in the home, in a man's bed). 36 Even though they have virtually
vanished from public antigay rhetoric, the prevalence of sexist assumptions is
revealed by continuing folk discourse about gay people, especially popular and even
academic obsession with the "sissy" or effeminate gay man and the "mannish"
lesbian. 137
C. The Sex Discrimination Argument for Homo Equality in
Light of the Multiple Roots of Homophobia
The foregoing history provides important but qualified support for the sex
discrimination argument for homo equality. The account supports Adrienne Rich's
view that the law's operation against lesbians in particular has been and remains
directly inspired by cultural resistance to women's deviation from traditional gender
norms. The bargaining position for all women within the military, in marriage, and
in child custody disputes is undermined by social and legal disapproval of women
having sex with or partnering with other women. That women as well as men
disapprove of lesbian relationships can be attributed largely to narcissistic
emotional needs to create a stable identity in opposition to the lesbian "Other," a
process the law intensely supported in the past and more weakly supports today. In
my view, the hysterical and obsessional features of homophobia are much less
prominent in antilesbian prejudice. Straight male pornography regularly deploys
women having sex with one another before they or one of them has sex with a man,
and the popularity of this motif suggests that sex between two women disgusts
straight men only if the women are permanently unavailable for sex with men. Fears
of lesbian conspiracies may become more pronounced as women achieve greater
power in our culture, but this obsessional theme seems subordinate to the
narcissistic theme.
136. See Miehelle MA Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in NontraditionalFields:
Casualties ofiheArmedForces War on Homoseuals, 13 HAIv. WoimN's L.J. 215, 219 (1990);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit ofManhood and the Desegregation of the Anned Forces, 38
UCLAL.REV. 499,546 (1991) Oinking military's segregation of women and exclusion of gays).
137. See PosNER, supra note 40, at 296-97, analyzed in Wflliam N. Eskridge, Jr.,A Social
Constructionist Critique ofPosner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a GaylegalAgenda, 102
YALEL.J. 333 (1992).
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But the account demonstrates that compulsory heterosexuality as to men is
animated by something more than rigid gender roles; it is animated by anxiety about
sexuality itself. Although early disapproval of male sexual inverts was fueled
largely by narcissistic anxieties, the hysterical and obsessional features of
homophobia have since World War I more strongly contributed to social
disapproval of and even violence against gay and bisexual men. The predatory
homosexual (man) has been a more powerful rallying point for homophobia than
the vampire lesbian. Even today, in debates over same-sex marriage, the natural law
opponents often claim that "homosexuals" convey venereal disease (including the
virus that causes AIDS) and prey on children, even though the data makes clear that
it is men generally (and not gay men alone) who do these things and that lesbians
seem to have the lowest rates of AIDS and child molestation of any of the
groupings.
If the sex discrimination argument for homo equality falters in any way with
respect to bisexual and gay men, it loses little or none of its power with respect to
gay and bisexual women. For example, sodomy laws, including laws regulating only
same-sex sodomy, reflect a sex negativity directed primarily at the most sexualized
group in our society, gay and bisexual men. Huber Walsh, the defendant in the
Missouri case, was arrested for fondling a decoy cop as a physical overture for
sex. 3 ' Walsh is representative of the declining number of people arrested for
consensual sodomy. Most of the cases challenging consensual sodomy laws in the
1970s and 1980s involved gay or bisexual men cruising parks and streets for
anonymous sex. Although men are the only gay people arrested under these
laws-as they are ridiculously easy to catch-the laws are deployed against lesbians
in custody and other legal proceedings and hence reinforce their sexist effect. For
the foregoing reasons, the sex discrimination argument outlined in Table 2 is fully
applicable to laws that make intercourse between two women, but not a woman and
a man illegal: the law classifies based on the sex of one of the partners, which is sex
discrimination in the same way that the law in McLaughlin was race
discrimination; 39 the sex-based classification on its face confines women to
traditional gender role of availability for sex with men; the anxieties underlying the
prohibition are for the most part the narcissistic anxieties that sexism and
homophobia most intimately share. The sex discrimination argument outlined in
Table 2 is substantially applicable to laws that make intercourse between two men,
but not a woman and a man, illegal: the law classifies based on the sex of one of the
partners, which is sex discrimination; the sex-based classification on its face
confines men to traditional gender role of man-fucks-woman; the anxieties
underlying the prohibition are narcissistic anxieties that sexism and homophobia
most intimately share, as well as hysterical and obsessional anxieties that are not
directly sexist but that are gendered (many people do not find oral sex between a
man and a woman disgusting in the way they see oral sex between two men).
The narcissistic feature of homophobia seems to be the dominant reason for state
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages for men as well as women. The most
popular arguments against same-sex marriage are that marriage is "definitionally"
138. See State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508,509 (Mo. 1986) (en bane).
139. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195 (1967).
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male-female and, relatedly, that same-sex marriage would undermine the institution
by obliterating that important requirement of sex differentiation. These are openly
gendered arguments, but another is not. Some opponents argue that recognizing
same-sex marriage would place a state stamp of approval on unions that are by
nature unclean and promiscuous, an appeal to the hysterical feature of homophobia.
But the revulsion some people have to sodomy cannot explain opposition to same-
sex marriage, because so many heterosexuals engage in such conduct, often within
marriage. To the extent sodomy is invoked to oppose same-sex marriage, it is only
same-sex sodomy and its inversion of the gendered role of at least one of the
partners. Although invoked as an argument against same-sex marriage by
traditionalists, the stereotype of the homosexual (male) as sexually promiscuous
would on the whole support the idea of homosexual marriage. Marriage in our
culture is a safe haven, channeling sex in productive directions, as a cement for
partnership and family. The hypersexualized person-the homosexual man-would
seem to need the civilizing features of marriage even more than the normally
sexualized person. Indeed, under traditionally gendered understandings, marriage
has been considered just as necessary for the super-sexualized male as for the less
sexualized female, because the institution civilizes the male and productively
channels his sexual energy. The sodomy revulsion and the supersexuality revulsion
work together, in fact: a married gay male couple will sublimate their supposed
excess sexual energy and presumably engage in less sodomy, as the reasoned
opponents of same-sex marriage concede.
Moreover, the fidelity argument also illustrates the gendered nature of objections
to same-sex marriage. The wildest, most beast-like heterosexual man is allowed to
marry, and the Supreme Court has held that even convicted murderers and rapists
have a presumptive right to marry.' Society and the polity encourage even the wild
man to many because of the traditional belief that a "domesticating" woman could
tame the wild man. Society does not entertain this belief for two men who want to
marry, in part because of gender stereotypes about men and the assumed absence
of children. (It is not clear whether the fidelity argument has any power for lesbian
marriages.) If same-sex marriage holds out no hope for taming the wild beast, it can
once more be traced to the strong hold that traditional gender attitudes exercise in
our culture-and another reason why the sex discrimination argument for homo
equality works so well in the context of same-sex marriage.
III. PRAGMATIC OBJECTIONS TO HoMo EQUALITY
The three biggest discriminations against gay people in America today are laws
criminalizing consensual sodomy, the military exclusion, and state and federal bars
to legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Ironically, the discrimination with the
greatest doctrinal support-laws criminalizing "homosexual sodomy," legitimated
by Hardwick-is the discrimination that has been and will continue to be
challenged most successfully; it is also the discrimination with the least support
among commentators. In contrast, the military exclusion and same-sex marriage
bars are the most doctrinally vulnerable but are widely thought to be impregnable
140. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,101 (1987).
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to constitutional challenge. And virtually no one who thought the military exclusion
or the same-sex marriage bar impregnable before Evans has changed her or his
mind after the Supreme Court's decision. The nicest critic of homo equality, Judge
Richard Posner, says that the killer argument is naked pragmatism: however logical
or moral the case for same-sex marriage or gays in the military, those gay-friendly
policies are too unpopular for the Supreme Court to force upon an unwilling
nation.' 4' This pragmatic objection to homo equality requires further exploration,
for what it reveals about equal protection and constitutional theory as well as its
implications for homo equality.
Philip Frickey and I anticipated Posner's point as part of a political theory of the
Court's public law jurisprudence. We maintained that the Court's public law
decisions consider both rule of law and policy arguments but also contain a
strategic element: In making choices, even in constitutional cases, the Court will be
influenced not only by legal texts, precedent, policy ramifications, but also by
signals from the President, Congress, and the public as to their reaction to different
possible decisions.'42 The Court will never ignore and rarely seek to upset a
political equilibrium (consensus) against a particular proposition, such as same-sex
marriage. Consistent with our theory and contrary to Carolene Products, the
Court's practice in equal protection cases rarely protects completely powerless
minorities against special censure and penalties widely accepted among the
population and its elites. Instead, the Court tends to protect once powerless groups
only after it has become clear that the group is politically mobilized and potentially
a partner in the pluralist system. Once the Court realizes that a previous political
equilibrium has shifted, it will move public law in the same direction. Thus, the
Court did not strike at apartheid until it had become a national embarrassment
(Brown), did not invalidate miscegenation laws until they had been repealed
everywhere outside the South (Loving), did not seriously review state and federal
sex discriminations until the Equal Rights Amendment was passed by large
majorities in Congress (Craig), did not nullify state sodomy laws when half the
states still had them (Hardwick), but pounced on a squirrelly antigay initiative
adopted by narrow margins in an outlier state (Evans).
Posner's pragmatic stance is dismissive of the constitutional arguments for same-
sex marriage and, probably also, gays in the military. At first glance, the broader
pragmatic idea of law as equilibrium seems to cut in the same direction. But the
matter is not so simple, and Evans is recognition that even pragmatic theories of
law must take seriously the claims of homo equality. Specifically, pragmatic
theories cannot ignore principle in a period of shifting equilibrium and ought to
recognize the modestly positive role that the judiciary can play in assuring the
conditions of equal citizenship for previously marginalized Americans.
141. PosNEt, supra note 40, at 318 (observing that gays in the military and same-sex marriage
are too daring for courts to accomplish); Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual
Marriage?AndIfSo, Who ShouldDecide?, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1578,1585-86 (1997) (reviewing
EsKRIDGE, supra note 106).
142. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Cour4 1993 Term
-Forward; Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26,46-47 (1994).
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A. Procedural Strategies for Coping with the Pragmatic
Dilemma in a Time of Shifting Political Equilibrium
Posner asserts that the Supreme Court dare not accept the logical arguments for
same-sex marriage, but the Supreme Court should be equally wary of rejecting the
arguments by an open appeal to Posner's reasoning, for it would expose the Court
as unprincipled. The Court would, in short, have to write a more persuasive opinion
than the one it wrote in Hardwick.'43 By narrowly focusing on and disrespecting
"homosexual sodomy," the Court came close to the kind of analysis Posner makes
against same-sex marriage. But even that indirect version of Posner's argument
brought widespread academic scorn upon the Court, as commentators-including
Posner-feasted on the Court's opinion like famished dieters. Moreover, the
Court's opinion mistook the intensely homophobic past for the future and got
caught in a normative transition that soon afterward also overwhelmed Judge Bork:
The American people, including many sex-negative Americans, believed in the
privacy of one's bedroom and viewed with distaste the state nosiness Hardwick
exposed. The Court faces a similar, albeit indeterminate, danger in a same-sex
marriage case. An analytically or factually flawed opinion would open the Court to
harsh criticism and fresh charges of antigay bias, especially if public opinion shifted
on the issue.'44 Even worse, for the Court, an unpersuasive opinion would further
expose the Court's activism in cases where racial classifications seek to remedy the
continuing legacy of apartheid. Consider an analogy to affirmative action.
InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court applied a nontextual (not in the
Fifth Amendment) equal protection right to hold that federal affirmative action must
be subjected to strict scrutiny.145 Unlike Loving, where the race-based classification
was motivated by precepts of white supremacy, Adarand made the race-based
classification the sole basis for strict scrutiny of a policy that was intended as a
remedy for the very white supremacist philosophy that undergirded the
antimiscegenation law in Loving. (Four dissenting Justices in Adarand rejected the
deployment of strict scrutiny of apartheid-remediation programs.) Most striking is
the analytical similarity between Adarand and Baehr, diagrammed in Table 3.
143. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186:(1986).
144. And even it as appears likely, it takes decades for public opinion to shift, who on the Court
wants to go down in history as the author of an antigay version ofPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)? (Pop quiz: As
most law students and many lawyers know, Justice Byron White was the author of Hardwick. Can
you name another majority opinion he wrote?)
145.515 U.S. 200,227,237 (1995).
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TABLE 3
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ANALOGY
Classification Disadvantaged Philosophical
Class Target
Loving Race Miscegenosexuals White
(Racial Minorities) Supremacy
Adarand Race Racial Remediation for
Majority Legacy of
Apartheid
Craig Sex Young Men Sexism
(Women)
Baehr Sex Sexual Orientation Compulsory
Minorities Heterosexuality
(Women) (Sexism)
Analytically, Adarand and Baehr are similar, in that the suspect classification itself
triggered heightened scrutiny, without any necessary link with traditional equal
protection considerations, namely, a pervasively disadvantaged class and invidious,
prejudice-based motivations. If Baehr is a radical extension of sex discrimination
law, it is merely following the example of Adarand in race discrimination law.
(Indeed, if homophobia is related to sexism, as Part II argues, Baehr is not radical
at all and is required by the Court's sex discrimination precedents.) Conversely, a
court claiming to subject remedial preferences to strict scrutiny on grounds of
consistency with other equal protection race precedents, as the Court claimed in
Adarand,'" should be subject to strong criticism for abandoning consistency and
congruence with equal protection sex precedents. For the Court to be exposed to
serious charges of unprincipled constitutional reasoning is bad enough; that the
apparent motivation for the inconsistency would be pandering to public hostility to
basic rights for gay people and minimal remediation for people of color, might
undermine, perhaps seriously, the perceived neutrality of the Supreme Court.
If the Court dare not require states to recognize same-sex marriage but fears the
risks of rejecting the sex discrimination argument without a defensible reason, the
Court is in a bind. But there are ways of negotiating the bind, what Professor
Alexander Bickel called "techniques of 'not doing,' devices for disposing of a case
while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue it raises."'47 For the foreseeable
future, the Court should leave state courts alone to develop the sex discrimination
argument for same-sex marriage or against sodomy laws. Presumably, courts
146. Id. at 229 (rejecting the view that "benign" racial classifications should be reviewed
leniently and insisting upon "consistency" whenever a suspect classification is under review).
147. ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREMiE COURT AT THE
BAR OFPOLTCS 169 (1962).
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accepting a sex discrimination argument for homo equality would, like the Baehr
court, rely on state constitutional grounds, over which the Supreme Court has no
review authority. If a state court were bold enough to rely on the U.S. Constitution
or if a gay couple losing at the state level were to seek federal constitutional review,
the Supreme Court should avoid the case, either by denying review (which is fully
within the Court's discretion) or finding the case prudentially or constitutionally
nonjusticiable, if possible under the Court's precedents. The hardest case for the
Court would be one where a lower court relied on federal constitutional law to
invalidate a state same-sex marriage bar. The Supreme Court would have the power
simply to deny review or even to dismiss any appeal on procedural grounds, 4 '
leaving the decision in place for that particular state but also leaving the issue open
for adjudication in other jurisdictions.
The wisdom of this approach is supported by the Court's experience in
Hardwick. The court of appeals had invalidated the Georgia statute on federal right
to privacy grounds. Because state and federal courts had taken a variety of positions
on the constitutionality of consensual sodomy laws, it was certainly not odd that the
Supreme Court would have granted review. As Justice Lewis Powell realized,
however, the Court did not have a well-considered basis for disposing of the appeal.
Powell himself was tom between a disinclination to assure gay people equal rights
and a skepticism that the sodomy law was legitimately applied to private intercourse
between consenting adults.'49 The appropriate course of action, in that event, would
have been to seek dismissal of the appeal as improvidently granted or to seek
reversal of the lower court on the ground that the case was moot (Hardwick had
been arrested but the charges were dropped). Deciding the case prematurely, and
in an opinion laced with disrespect for gay people, has been more damaging to the
Court's legitimacy than any other course of action the Court could have taken. With
due deference to the Justices, I proffer that they have much to learn about same-sex
marriage and therefore must not close off constitutional discourse on that subject
prematurely.
B. The Rule of Law and Tolerable Sexual Variation
Under a conservative pragmatic theory such as Posner's, one would not expect
the Court to adopt heightened scrutiny as a basis for reviewing sexual orientation
classifications until a majority of the Justices accept the idea of benign sexual
variation"° and believe there is enough political cover for them to enforce the idea
148. If four Justices voted to grant review, the Court would have to hear the case, but if the
remaining five Justices believed the case nonjusticiable they could vote to dismiss the appeal.
Compare, e., New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (denying certiorari for an appeal of the
state court invalidation of a sodomy law on federal constitutional grounds), with Uplinger v. New
York, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (voting to dismiss an appeal of the state court invalidation of the
solicitation of "deviate sexual relations" law).
149. See JOHN C. JEFPRmS, JR., JusTnc LEews F. POWELL, JR. 519-20 (1994).
150. "Benign sexual variation" is anthropologist Gayle Rubin's term for the idea that there may
be several rather than just one healthy sexual orientation. Gayle Rubin, Thinking ofSex: Notesfor
a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEAURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE
SEXUALrrY 267,283 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
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under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Court accepts the ideas of benign
racial, gender, and religious variation, and the country's public culture is at least
acquiescent, the Court will not allow state penalties because of an individual's race,
gender, or religion. Because the Justices probably do not accept the idea of benign
sexual variation and the country decidedly does not, neither prerequisite for
heightened scrutiny of sexual orientation classifications is in place, but if the Court
or the country were to move toward these precepts in the new millennium, virtually
all the foregoing discriminations would become embattled and fall away, as race-
based and sex-based classifications have done.
Perhaps for the foregoing reason, Evans did not address the issue of heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications. But even a conservative pragmatism
ought to support a reading of Evans that commits the current Court to the idea of
tolerable sexual variation, that most variations in sexuality ought to be tolerated
by the state, even if not embraced or encouraged. This reading of Evans is morally,
politically, and legally defensible. It is morally defensible because there is no
credible evidence for the proposition, still accepted by many Americans, that sexual
variation is necessarily a defect. Not only is there no credible evidence that people
whose orientation is toward people of their own sex are mentally or psychologically
dysfunctional or harmful to others, but there is substantial evidence that gay people
are as functional as straight people. 5'
A reading of Evans that insists on state toleration of sexual minorities is also
politically defensible, even in a polity containing many people who find the minority
repugnant Whatever the ultimate status of gay people in the United States, they will
remain a visible and significant citizenry for the foreseeable future. Unless gay
people systematically harm others, the state cannot afford to demonize them through
laws criminalizing their consensual conduct, exclusions from the civil service, and
intrusions into their family life. Intolerance induces a destructive process of state
witch-hunts and private hiding, thereby squandering valuable human resources that
could be expended in producing public benefits and problem-solving. At the very
level of two-person cooperation, when one person feels she has to be guarded and
secretive about herself, the whole enterprise of cooperation will be compromised,
if only a little. Multiplied manifold, this social loss is very significant. State
intolerance also creates unnecessary risks for a society, especially the possibility of
a malignant dynamic of anger. When the state makes it a crime to express oneself
as a Jew, as a lover of Africans, or as a homosexual, the state is likely to embitter
the objects of the suppression and to empower its own worst bigots. As to the later,
the person who is most likely to enforce rules of suppression is a person who feels
the most intense animosity toward the targeted class. By empowering such people,
the state is rewarding its most potentially vicious citizens. By demonizing a viable
and nonharmful community, the state is inviting social turmoil.' Kulturkampf-a
151. Lest I be misunderstood, there is nothing in the foregoing statements that pertains to other
kinds of sexual variation. For example, the moral issues presented by people who are attracted to
prepubeseent children (most of whom are heterosexual) are substantially different than those
presented by people who are attracted to adults of either sex.
152. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 98 (1992).
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state campaign to erase a nomic minority-is politically destructive as well as
morally squalid.
Finally, rule of law ideas support a reading of Evans that requires state toleration
of gay people. In a liberal polity, the rule of law, neutrally applied, facilitates both
public obedience and private cooperation. If the law stands ready to enforce private
obligations and protect against public intrusions for all citizens and without
discrimination, each citizen is more likely to obey the law herself and to think that
she can trust others to deal with her in a nondiscriminatory way. If the law is
intolerant of gay people, the state is sending a signal that they cannot rely on the law
in the ways that others can; that signal, in turn, suggests to its recipients that they
are outside the rule of law, which in turn ought to render them less likely to obey
the law and to cooperate with outsiders. The human and social costs of this exercise
are manageable if the group is small and destructive (e.g., drug dealers); they are
potentially large if the group is substantial and productive (e.g., gay people). As
Evans implicitly recognized, a robust defense of nondiscrimination laws is a state
signal that public and private intolerance cannot proceed along specified lines of
race, sex, and increasingly sexual orientation.
Evans ought to be read to institute a principle of gay tolerance in equal protection
law. Such a principle would be presumptively skeptical of consensual sodomy laws,
especially those applicable only to same-sex sodomy; bars to adoption and
presumptions against child custody by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered
parents; and employment exclusions. A principle of tolerance would not necessarily
require the state to recognize same-sex marriage and would be open to a don't ask,
don't tell policy in the armed forces.
As to the latter, a neutral rule of law regime ought to be sympathetic to a policy
seeking a middle ground between two competing rights. In the close-quartered
context of the armed forces, there may be such competing rights-the right of gay
people to serve in the armed forces and the right of homophobes not to share
showerrooms with people they fear. As a matter of equal protection, it might be
acceptable to require gay personnel to be discreet in return for allowing them to
serve. The problem with the military's don't ask, don't tell policy, however, is that
it is inherently unstable, because obsessional homophobes will insist on asking and
even discreet gay people often end up telling, sometimes completely by accident.
C. Shared Values, Normative Discourse, and Benign
Sexual Variation
If conservative pragmatists are right that cultural consensus can influence public
law, a progressive pragmatist might ask why law cannot influence cultural
consensus. 3' The Supreme Court has the power, which it exercised in Evans, to
stimulate discussion about the nature of homophobia and the appropriate role of the
state. By imposing heightened scrutiny on state policies that discriminate against
gay people, the Court has the further power to place the burden of persuasion as to
153. On the differences between conservative pragmatism, exemplified by Wiliam James, and
progressive pragmatism, exemplified by Richard Rorty, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal
Narratives, 46 STAN. L. Rnv. 607, 622 (1994).
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antigay policies on the state rather than on gay challengers. This would trigger an
increased number of challenges and would be fatal to most types of discriminations.
As to those discriminations, American opinion is divided enough that the Court's
action could be the signal which "tips" public discourse from viewing homophobia
as morally or politically acceptable, to viewing it as unacceptable in public culture,
the way open racism and sexism now are. On issues such as open antigay
discrimination by public police forces, in the civil service, and in child custody and
adoption, public opinion is divided enough for skeptical scrutiny by the Supreme
Court or a state supreme court to prove fatal to such policies. Given their
irrationality and frequent injustice, there is no good reason of equal protection
principle or even of political pragmatism not to strike them down.
As to more controversial matters such as the military exclusion and, most
prominently, same-sex marriage, the Court's fear is that activism in favor of gay
rights would be understood as placing a state or judicial "stamp of approval" on
"homosexuality," would generate a constitutional amendment overriding pro-gay
decisions generally, and would tip public opinion against the Court itself. This was
the Court's fear in 1955-1956, expressed by its decisions in Naim v. Naim,5 4 which
refused in the wake of Brown to strike down laws prohibiting different-race
marriage, then operative in most states. Only after states outside the south had
repealed their laws did the Court strike them down in Loving.' The lesson of Naim
and Loving, however, is not that the Court needs to kowtow to hostile public
opinion, but rather that the Court needs to proceed cautiously when pressing
equality rights in the most controversial contexts for those rights. The Court in
Naim anticipated Bickel's theory"6 of doing good by not doing anything: The Court
remanded the miscegenation law case to the Virginia Supreme Court for implicit
reconsideration in light of Brown."7 The Virginia court reaffirmed its prior opinion
upholding the law based upon natural law reasoning,' and the Supreme Court
dismissed the final appeal on a (rather implausible) procedural technicality.'5 9
However unprincipled the decision might have been, it had this virtue: At no point
did the Court approve or sanction laws against different-race marriage, leaving
time for the issue to percolate in the lower courts. Loving itself was handed down
only after the Court had sent up a successful trial balloon in McLaughlin, which
struck down a law prohibiting different-race cohabitation. Moreover, the Court's
successful action in Loving has contributed to shifting public opinion on the issue
of different-race marriage. While half of the country still disapproves of such
marriages for themselves or their children, an overwhelming majority believe that
154. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.) (declaring the marriage between a Chinese and a Caucasian void),
vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), adhered to on remand, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va.), motion
to recall mandate denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
155. The Hawaii Supreme Court's unexpected decision inBaehr generated a strange override
effort, in which Hawaii voters are being asked to amend the state constitution to empower the
legislature to override any ultimate decision by the court requiring the state to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples.
156. See supra text accompanying note 147.
157. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam).
158. See Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849,850 (Va. 1956).
159. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
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the matter should be one of individual choice and not prohibited by the state. A final
lesson of Loving for same-sex marriage is that such litigation initially needs to
proceed at the state level. So long as there is not a single state in the union that
recognizes same-sex marriages, federal constitutional arguments for them will not
get beyond the Naim threshhold.
Theoretically the Court has the power not only to induce more tolerant,
cooperative attitudes in the public sphere, but also to induce new shared values in
the private sphere if it commits itself to formal equality for a previously excluded
group. One reason has to do with a politics of presence: Once mainstream people
work and cooperate with people of the excluded group, they tend to form more
favorable attitudes and discard at least some of the inaccurate stereotypes. The most
dramatic illustration of this process was the desegregation of the armed forces
between 1948 and 1954. White soldiers and officers overwhelmingly opposed
desegregation, based on racist fears about people of color, but after experience with
such people whites supported or acquiesced in the policy. 6 0 Desegregation, of
course, occurred by order of President Truman and not by order of the Supreme
Court, which undermines its precedent as an argument for the Supreme Court to
override the President and Congress to overturn the don't ask, don't tell policy. But
this example dramatically confirms the importance of institutional context in
shaping private preferences.
On the issue of same-sex marriage, courts can at least do what the Hawaii
Supreme Court did in Baehr: put the issue on a local agenda and reverse the
presumption, from one prohibiting such marriages to one favoring them. If same-
sex marriages are recognized in Hawaii or another state, even if just for a period of
time, that recognition would have none of the immediately dramatic consequences
hoped for by gay fights leaders or feared by the most intense homophobes. As the
example of Denmark reveals, one might expect several thousand couples, including
many out-of-staters, to take advantage of the state recognition. Few if any states
would immediately follow Hawaii's example, nor would many states recognize
Hawaii same-sex marriages in their jurisdictions. God would not send the locusts
on America. Yet the judicially triggered change in the law would instantiate norms
yet to be determined. My guess is that same-sex marriage, even if deployed by a
modest number of couples, would contribute, perhaps in just minor ways, to norms
of toleration, family values, and sexual moderation. Gay people, including gay
couples, would find an increasing social acceptance over time and, more
importantly, would become increasingly integrated into mainstream religions and
extended families. Marriage would have some impact in reducing sexual
promiscuity, especially among gay and bisexual men, and would contribute to the
public health campaign against AIDS. The institution of marriage would be
strengthened by the enthusiastic new recruits, and a little bit more stability could
be assured for children reared in same-sex households. Without believing for a
second that same-sex marriages will be free of the problems already associated with
different-sex marriages, and some new problems yet to be uncovered, I am
confident that same-sex marriage will in little ways be good for gay people, good
160. See MoRm J. MAcGREcOR, JR., INTERATIoN OF THE ARMED FORCEs, 1940-1965, at 40,
408-10,441-42 (1981).
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for straight people, and good for America. And if I am wrong, the experiment will
prove me wrong. Let it begin.
